Just Apologies: An Overview of the Philosophical Issues by Smith, Nick
Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal
Volume 13 | Issue 1 Article 3
2-15-2013
Just Apologies: An Overview of the Philosophical
Issues
Nick Smith
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/drlj
Part of the Dispute Resolution and Arbitration Commons, Law and Society Commons, and the
Other Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at Pepperdine Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal by an authorized editor of Pepperdine Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
josias.bartram@pepperdine.edu , anna.speth@pepperdine.edu.
Recommended Citation
Nick Smith, Just Apologies: An Overview of the Philosophical Issues, 13 Pepp. Disp. Resol. L.J. Iss. 1 (2013)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/drlj/vol13/iss1/3
[Vol. 13: 35, 2013]  
PEPPERDINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION LAW JOURNAL 
35 
Just Apologies: An Overview of the 
Philosophical Issues 
Nick Smith* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A. The Meanings of Apologies 
In 2008, I published I Was Wrong: The Meanings of Apologies.1  I orig-
inally intended to both establish a conceptual framework for apologetic 
meaning and apply that framework to law in I Was Wrong.  That proved na-
ively ambitious.  One book became two as I realized the richness and nuanc-
es of the subject.  The first book would develop a framework for apologetic 
meanings.  The second book would apply and expand that framework to law.  
This article provides an overview of the issues addressed in that second 
book, titled Just Apologies: Remorse, Reform, and Punishment. 
I Was Wrong provides a theoretical framework for the meanings of 
apologies from individuals and collectives.  Discussing numerous examples 
from ancient and recent history, I Was Wrong argues that we suffer from 
considerable confusion about the moral meanings and social functions of 
these complex interactions.  Rather than asking the binary question of 
whether a speech act “is or is not” an apology, I attempt to account for the 
many ways that acts of contrition succeed or fail to achieve diverse objec-
tives.  Guided by a philosopher’s sensibilities, I lead readers though a series 
of interdisciplinary questions, arguing that apologies have evolved from a 
confluence of diverse cultural and religious practices that do not translate 
easily into pluralistic secular discourse.  After distinguishing several varie-
ties of apologies between individuals, I Was Wrong makes the case for a ro-
bust core of moral meaning in what I name a “categorical apology.” 
I Was Wrong considers the many gritty details of apologetic meaning, 
but in general, I find that asking a few simple questions can take us to the 
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 1. NICK SMITH, I WAS WRONG: THE MEANINGS OF APOLOGIES (2008) (providing a theoreti-
cal framework for apologies from individuals and from groups). 
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heart of the significance of an apology: did the offender explain what she did 
with an appropriate degree of specificity?  Does she accept blame rather than 
merely expressing sympathy?  Does she resist casting the offense as an acci-
dent or otherwise denying that it was her intention to harm?  Does she make 
clear why her actions were wrong and identify the principles she violated?  
Does she promise not to do it again?  Does she keep that promise?  Does she 
provide appropriate redress?  These concerns lead to further questions about 
any given apology, but these issues indicate whether the gesture of contrition 
in question conveys thick moral meaning.  I then turn to collectives.  Alt-
hough apologies from corporations, governments, and other groups can be 
profoundly significant, I note the kinds of meaning that collective apologies 
often do not convey, and I warn of the dangers of collective acts of contri-
tion that allow individual wrongdoers to obscure their personal blame. 
In addition to my home disciplines of law and philosophy, I consider in-
terdisciplinary literature on causation and moral responsibility, moral in-
commensurability, the normative status of emotions, feminist phenomenolo-
gy, forgiveness, speech act theory, collective responsibility, collective 
intentionality, collective mental states, and other occasionally technical 
fields bearing on the moral meanings of apologies.  My attempt to provide a 
holistic theoretical framework for the meanings of apologies that synthesized 
all relevant knowledge from any discipline led me to engage not only phi-
losophers but also sociologists (Nicholas Tavuchis was a primary interlocu-
tor), psychologists, linguists, political scientists, feminists of various disci-
plines, law faculty, anthropologists, theologians, and anyone who has written 
on contrition.  I attempted to engage all scholarship available in English that 
I could find on apologies from any discipline, including empirical research 
from various social sciences.  At times, this work felt impossibly interdisci-
plinary. 
B. The Two Faces of Just Apologies 
I undertook the research in I Was Wrong with the ultimate goal of 
providing the sort of conceptual precision that might illuminate the role of 
apologies within legal systems.  This became especially important to me af-
ter I spent time digesting empirical research on apologizing and I realized 
that many of these studies operated with—and perpetuated—deeply prob-
lematic definitions.  In many cases, a study would simply stipulate a contro-
versial definition without attempting to explain, for instance, why an apolo-
gy did not require an acceptance of responsibility or a demonstrated 
commitment not to reoffend.  Some researchers simply “count” every utter-
ance of “sorry” as an apology, even in cases of “I’m sorry your grandmother 
passed away” or “I’m sorry you feel that way.”  Though I am deeply inter-
2
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ested in empirical questions related to apologies—such as whether women 
apologize more frequently than men or whether apologies track recidivism 
rates in juvenile criminal offenders—I realized that a philosopher’s analysis 
of these complex conceptual issues might be useful for social scientists.  
While I Was Wrong attempted to provide a comprehensive interdisciplinary 
theory of the meanings of apologies for researchers, from various perspec-
tives interested in issues related to reconciliation, Just Apologies aims to 
synthesize research from the humanities and social sciences into a unified 
account of the role of apologies in law that might serve as a conceptual 
framework for further research in legal apologies across disciplines. 
My interest in Just Apologies developed from a pair of interrelated ar-
guments: 
1) We often find apologies on the frontlines of contemporary practi-
cal moral discourse; and 
2) The law and modern legal environments structure our thinking 
about apologies. 
On this first point, I claimed in I Was Wrong that much of our private 
and public moral discourse occurs in the giving, receiving, or demanding of 
apologies, yet we rarely make explicit precisely what we expect from a ges-
ture of contrition.  As a result, apologizing has become a vague, clumsy, and 
sometimes spiteful ritual.  We intuitively understand that certain kinds of 
apologies can be life transforming for both victims and offenders. Whether 
teaching our children when and how to say they are sorry, expecting contri-
tion from our spouse when we feel wronged, or lobbying for an apology 
from institutions responsible for historical injustices like African slavery, 
apologies provide one of the most familiar and significant occasions when 
we think explicitly about our shared values.  Apologies are the daily bread of 
our moral discourse.  As we all know, however, some apologies can be 
worse than none at all.  Empty gestures may masquerade as soul searching 
apologies, sometimes because this seems like the least burdensome means of 
restoring a relationship.  On other occasions, an offender may intentionally 
wish to deceive or manipulate a victim with an apology.  Such duplicity oc-
curs not only between adversaries but also among friends, relatives, and lov-
ers.  Whether an unrepentant executive orders her attorney to feign contri-
tion so that an injured party will settle a claim, or an abusive husband with 
no intention to reform says to his wife that he is “sorry that” she is upset, we 
can see how victims stand to suffer further injuries if they attribute more 
meaning to an apology than warranted. 
On the second point, I have argued that if religion and its practices of 
repentance once provided the primary backdrop that framed our understand-
3
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ings of apologies, law increasingly plays that role in modern life.  A specific 
kind of legal environment, driven by adversarial procedures and oriented 
toward economic outcomes, increasingly structures our apologies.  Whereas 
apologies tend to bring people together, adversarial law typically pushes le-
gal combatants apart in what is often a high stakes competition.  Thus, it 
might seem like apologies would play a minor role in modern legal proceed-
ings, but the situation is decidedly more complex. 
Apologies in both civil and criminal law pull in opposite directions.  On 
the one hand—and as we might initially expect—apologies seem out of 
place in most modern legal contexts.  What I describe as categorical apolo-
gies, for instance, admit guilt. Whether in criminal hearings, corporate set-
tlement negotiations, or malpractice litigation, admitting guilt can amount to 
complete legal defeat.  Providing a categorical apology within an adversarial 
justice system can amount to legal suicide.2  For these reasons, some medi-
cal malpractice insurers will void their policies if doctors provide too many 
details to injured patients.3  As the American Medical Association once 
warned physicians: “Anything you say can and will be held against you.”4  
Criminal defense attorneys will likewise strongly advise their clients to resist 
apologizing to their victims, even if they feel a moral compunction to “come 
clean” early in the proceedings.  Corporate executives and directors of vari-
ous institutions resist apologizing not only because they fear personal expo-
sure to liability, but also because they risk breaching fiduciary duties to their 
constituencies.5  In this respect, the sorts of morally rich apologies described 
in I Was Wrong seem antithetical to the very spirit of modern adversarial 
law.  Legal battlegrounds hardly provide an environment conducive to rec-
onciliation through moral transformation.6 
On the other hand, current legal trends undisputedly point toward a rise 
in the prevalence of certain kinds of apologies in law.  Building on findings 
in the social sciences, legal scholarship and legislation now reinforce the be-
 
 2. See Deborah Levi, The Role of Apology in Mediation, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1165, 1186–87 
(1997) (“If a party asks for an apology, the opposing lawyer is likely to regard that party as intransi-
gent and to protect her client from the risk that evidence of apology could become a basis for assign-
ing liability in a subsequent legal proceeding.”). 
 3. MICHAEL WOODS, HEALING WORDS: THE POWER OF APOLOGY IN MEDICINE 52–53 (Cen-
ter for Physician Leadership 2007). 
 4. AMA, “MEDICAL PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY INSURANCE” 133 (1998).  See also Jonathan 
R. Cohn, Advising Clients to Apologize, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 1009, 1027 n.60 (1999) (suggesting that 
lawyers should consider advising their clients to apologize for harm for which they are responsible). 
 5. Id. at 1027. 
 6. See Lee Taft, Apology Subverted: The Commodification of Apology, 109 YALE L.J. 1135, 
1150 (2000) (“This competition is captured in a lawsuit, the purpose of which is to establish the fault 
of one party and offer relief to the other.  This is hardly an atmosphere that encourages expressions 
of remorse.”) 
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lief that strategically timed and worded apologies can prevent litigation alto-
gether, reduce damage payments and jury awards by considerable amounts, 
or shave years from prison sentences.7  In criminal law, the U.S. Federal 
 
 7. For discussions of the role of apologies in criminal law by legal scholars appearing in law 
reviews, see Cheryl G. Bader, “Forgive Me Victim for I Have Sinned”: Why Repentance and the 
Criminal Justice System Do Not Mix—A Lesson from Jewish Law, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 69 
(2003); Stephanos Bibas & Richard A. Bierschbach, Integrating Remorse and Apology into Criminal 
Procedure, 114 YALE L.J. 85 (2004); Stephanos Bibas, Transparency and Participation in Criminal 
Procedure, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 911, 931, 954 (2006); Ellen M. Bryant, Section 3E1.1 of the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines: Bargaining with the Guilty, 44 CATH. U. L. REV. 1269 (1995); Charles R. 
Calleros, Conflict, Apology, and Reconciliation at Arizona State University: A Second Case Study in 
Hateful Speech, 27 CUMB. L. REV. 91 (1997); Sherry Colb, Profiling With Apologies, 1 OHIO ST. J. 
CRIM. L. 611 (2004) (discussing how compensation can act as a form of apology in cases of racial 
profiling); Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Apologize and Move On?: Finding a Remedy for Por-
nography, Insult, and Hate Speech, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 93 (1996); Theodore Eisenberg et al., But 
Was He Sorry? The Role of Remorse in Capital Sentencing, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1599 (1998); Mar-
gareth Etienne & Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Apologies and Plea Bargaining, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 295 
(2007); Margareth Etienne, Remorse, Responsibility, and Regulating Advocacy: Making Defendants 
Pay for the Sins of Their Lawyers, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2103 (2003); Stephen P. Garvey, Punishment 
as Atonement, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1801 (1999); Stephen P. Garvey, Restorative Justice, Punishment, 
and Atonement, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 303 (2003); John H. Langbein, Torture and Plea Bargaining, 46 
U. CHI. L. REV. 3 (1978); Elizabeth Latif, Apologetic Justice: Evaluating Apologies Tailored To-
ward Legal Solutions, 81 B. U. L. REV. 289 (2001); Candace McCoy, Plea Bargaining as Coercion: 
The Trial Penalty and Plea Bargaining Reform, 50 CRIM. L. Q. 67 (2005) (discussing remorse as one 
of the reasons the accused may choose to plea-bargain); Daniel S. Medwed, The Innocent Prisoner’s 
Dilemma: Consequences of Failing to Admit Guilt at Parole Hearings, 93 IOWA L. REV. 491 (2008); 
Erin Ann O’Hara, Apology and Thick Trust: What Spouse Abusers and Negligent Doctors Might 
Have in Common, 79 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1055 (2004); Michael O’Hear, Remorse, Cooperation, and 
“Acceptance of Responsibility”: The Structure, Implementation, and Reform of Section 3E1.1 of the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 1507 (1997); Lisa F. Orenstein, Sentencing Leni-
ency May Be Denied to Criminal Offenders Who Fail to Express Remorse at Allocution, 56 MD. L. 
REV. 780 (1997); Abigail Penzell, Apology in the Context of Wrongful Conviction: Why the System 
Should Say It’s Sorry, 9 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 145 (2007); Scott E. Sundby, The Capital 
Jury and Absolution: The Intersection of Trial Strategy, Remorse, and the Death Penalty, 83 
CORNELL L. REV. 1557 (1998); Susan Szmania & Daniel Mangis, Finding the Right Time and 
Place: A Case Study Comparison of the Expression of Offender Remorse in Traditional Justice and 
Restorative Justice Contexts, 89 MARQ. L. REV. 335 (2005); Robert Weisberg, Apology, Legislation, 
and Mercy, 82 N.C. L. REV. 1415 (2004); Brent T. White, Saving Face: The Benefits of Not Saying 
I’m Sorry, 72 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 261 (2009). 
For an exchange on remorse, apology, and mercy, see CRIMINAL LAW CONVERSATIONS (Paul Rob-
inson et al. eds., 2009). For a recent symposium on mercy in criminal law, see generally Symposi-
um, 4 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. (2007). 
For discussions of “shaming sanctions,” see ANDREW VON HIRSCH, CENSURE AND SANCTIONS 82 
(1996); Stephen P. Garvey, Can Shaming Punishments Educate?, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 733 (1998); 
Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591 (1996) (for Kahan’s 
revised views, see Dan M. Kahan, What’s Really Wrong with Shaming Sanctions, 84 TEX. L. REV. 
5
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Sentencing Guidelines permit judges to reduce punishments by considerable 
amounts for defendants who “accept responsibility” for their crimes and 
“express remorse.”8  U.S. Supreme Court Justice Anthony Kennedy once 
claimed that expressions of remorse can be the difference between life and 
death in capital sentencing procedures9 and several studies confirm this.10  
According to Robbennolt’s review, the social scientific literature has cor-
roborated various versions of the claims that apologies or expressions of re-
morse 
favorably influence attributions of offender responsibility, estimates 
of the likelihood that the behavior will recur, perceptions of the 
wrongdoer, expectations about, the effects of the incident on the 
parties’ relationship, affective reactions, and behaviors such as for-
giveness, aggression, and recommendations for punishment.”11  Phi-
 
2075 (2006)); James Q. Whitman, What Is Wrong with Inflicting Shame Sanctions?, 107 YALE L.J. 
1055 (1998). 
 8. See U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1; see also United States v. Fagan, 162 F.3d 1280, 1284 (10th Cir. 
1998); United States v. Hammick, 36 F.3d 594, 600 (7th Cir. 1994); United States v. Camargo, 908 
F.2d 179 (7th Cir. 1990). 
 9. Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 144 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 10. See Theodore Eisenberg et al., supra note 7; Chris L. Kleinke et al., Evaluation of a Rapist 
as a Function of Expressed Intent and Remorse, 132 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 525 (1992); Randolph B. 
Pipes & Marci Alessi, Remorse and a Previously Punished Offense in Assignment of Punishment 
and Estimated Likelihood of a Repeated Offense, 85 PSYCHOL. REP. 246 (1999); Michael G. Rum-
sey, Effects of Defendant Background and Remorse on Sentencing Judgments, 6 J. APPLIED SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 64 (1976); Scott E. Sundby, supra note 7. 
 11. Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Apologies and Settlement Levers, 3 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 
333, 339 (2006). For example of discussions of apologies in criminal law by social scientists, see 
SUSAN ALTER, APOLOGIZING FOR SERIOUS WRONGDOING: SOCIAL, PSYCHOLOGICAL, AND LEGAL 
CONSIDERATIONS, FINAL REP. FOR THE LAW COMMISSION OF CANADA (1999); William Austin et 
al., Equity and the Law: The Effects of a Harmdoer’s “Suffering in the Act” on Liking and Assigned 
Punishment, in ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 217 (Leonard Berkowitz & Elaine 
Walster eds., 1976); Gordon Bazemore & Mark Umbreit, A Comparison of Four Restorative Sen-
tencing Models, in A RESTORATIVE JUSTICE READER: TEXTS, SOURCES, CONTEXT (Gerry Johnstone 
ed., 2003); Anthony Bottoms, Some Sociological Reflections on Restorative Justice, in 
RESTORATIVE JUSTICE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE: COMPETING OR RECONCILABLE PARADIGMS 79 
(Andrew von Hirsch et al. eds., 2003) [hereinafter RESTORATIVE JUSTICE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE]; 
Walter J. Dickey, Forgiveness and Crime: The Possibilities of Restorative Justice, in EXPLORING 
FORGIVENESS 106 (Robert D. Enright & Joanna North eds., 1998); Heather Strang, Justice for Vic-
tims of Young Offenders: The Centrality of Emotional Harm and Restoration, in A RESTORATIVE 
JUSTICE READER: TEXTS, SOURCES, CONTEXT 286 (Gerry Johnstone ed., 2003); HOWARD ZEHR, 
CHANGING LENSES: A NEW FOCUS FOR CRIME AND JUSTICE (1990); Dana Bramel et al., An Observ-
er’s Reaction to the Suffering of His Enemy, 8 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 384 (1968); Marti 
H. Gonzales et al., Victims as “Narrative Critics”: Factors Influencing Rejoinders and Evaluative 
Responses to Offenders’ Accounts, 20 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 691 (1994); Kleinke, 
supra note 10; Keith E. Niedermeier et al., Exceptions to the Rule: The Effects of Remorse, Status, 
and Gender on Decision Making, 31 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 604 (2001); Carrie S. Petrucci, 
Apology in the Criminal Justice Setting: Evidence for Increasing Apology as an Additional Compo-
nent in the Legal System, 20 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 337 (2002); Randolph B. Pipes & Marci Alessi, Re-
morse and a Previously Punished Offense in Assignment of Punishment and Estimated Likelihood of 
6
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losophers now pay increasing attention to the role of apologies in 
punishment.12 
 
a Repeated Offense, 85 PSYCHOL. REP. 246 (1999); D. Robinson et al., Heinous Crime or Unfortu-
nate Accident? The Effects of Remorse on Responses to Mock Criminal Confessions, 73 SOC. 
FORCES 175 (1994); Michael G. Rumsey, Effects of Defendant Background and Remorse on Sen-
tencing Judgments, 6 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 64 (1976); 
Gary S. Schwartz et al., The Effects of Post-Transgression Remorse on Perceived Aggression, At-
tribution of Intent, and Level of Punishment, 17 J. SOC. & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 293 (1978); Jerry I. 
Shaw & James A. McMartin, Perpetrator or Victim? Effects of Who Suffers in an Automobile Acci-
dent on Judgmental Strictness, 3 SOC. BEHAV. & PERSONALITY 5 (1975); Christy Taylor & Chris L. 
Kleinke, Effects of Severity of Accident, History of Drunk Driving, Intent, and Remorse on Judg-
ments of a Drunk Driver, 22 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1641 (1992); Harry S. Upshaw & Daniel 
Romer, Punishment For One’s Misdeeds as a Function of Having Suffered From Them, 2 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 162 (1976); Robert R. Weyeneth, The Power of Apology and 
the Process of Historical Reconciliation, 23 THE PUB. HISTORIAN 9 (Summer 2001); Howard Zehr, 
Why Can’t We Just Apologize?, 11 CRIME VICTIMS REP. 38 (2007). 
 12. For discussions of apologies in criminal law by philosophers, see CHRISTOPHER BENNETT, 
THE APOLOGY RITUAL: A PHILOSOPHICAL THEORY OF PUNISHMENT (2008); Christopher Bennett, 
Apology and Reparation in a Multicultural State, in LAW AND PHILOSOPHY 459 (Ross Harrison ed., 
2007); JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESTORATIVE JUSTICE AND RESPONSIVE REGULATION (2002) (note that 
Braithwaite’s doctoral training is in sociology, but he publishes in philosophy journals as well as 
various other disciplines); Meir Dan Cohen, Revising the Past: On the Metaphysics of Repentance, 
Forgiveness, and Pardon, in FORGIVENESS, MERCY, AND CLEMENCY 117 (Austin Sarat & Nasser 
Hussain eds., 2007); ANTONY DUFF, PUNISHMENT, COMMUNICATION, AND COMMUNITY (2001); 
ANTHONY DUFF, TRIALS AND PUNISHMENTS (1986); FORGIVENESS, MERCY, AND CLEMENCY (Aus-
tin Sarat & Nassir Hussain eds., 2007); FROM SOCIAL JUSTICE TO CRIMINAL JUSTICE (W.C. Heffer-
nan & John Kleinig eds., 2000); MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE 
PRISON (Alan Sheridan trans., 1995); IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE 
101 (John Ladd trans., 1999) (1797); KATHLEEN D. MOORE, PARDONS: JUSTICE, MERCY, AND THE 
PUBLIC INTEREST (1989); JEFFRIE G. MURPHY, GETTING EVEN: FORGIVENESS AND ITS LIMITS 
(2003); Jeffrie Murphy, Repentance, Punishment, and Mercy, in REPENTANCE: A COMPARATIVE 
PERSPECTIVE 143 (Amitai Etzioni & David Carney eds., 1997); LINDA RADZIK, MAKING AMENDS: 
ATONEMENT IN MORALITY, LAW, AND POLITICS (2009); RICHARD SWINBURN, RESPONSIBILITY AND 
ATONEMENT (1989); MARGARET U. WALKER, MORAL REPAIR: RECONSTRUCTING MORAL 
RELATIONS AFTER WRONGDOING (2006); ANDREW VON HIRSCH, CENSURE AND SANCTIONS (1996); 
ANDREW VON HIRSCH & ANDREW ASHWORTH, PROPORTIONATE SENTENCING: EXPLORING THE 
PRINCIPLES (2005); Andrew von Hirsch, Punishment, Penance and the State, in PUNISHMENT AND 
POLITICAL THEORY 69 (Matt Matravers ed., 1999); Andrew von Hirsch et al., Restorative Justice: A 
‘Making Amends’ Model?, in RESTORATIVE JUSTICE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 11, at 21; 
Brenda M. Baker, Penance as a Model for Punishment, 18 SOC. THEORY & PRAC. 311 (1992); 
Christopher Bennett, Taking the Sincerity Out of Saying Sorry: Restorative Justice as Ritual, 23 J. 
APPLIED PHIL. 127 (2006); John Braithwaite, Repentance Rituals and Restorative Justice, 8 J. POL. 
PHIL. 115 (2000); Jean Hampton, The Moral Education Theory of Punishment, 13 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 
208 (1984); Robert Justin Lipkin, Punishment, Penance, and the Respect for Autonomy, 14 SOC. 
THEORY & PRAC. 87 (1988); Jeffrie G. Murphy, Remorse, Apology and Mercy, 4 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. 
L. 423 (2007); Jeffrie G. Murphy, Well Excuse Me!--Remorse, Apology, and Criminal Sentencing, 
38 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 371 (2006); Wojciech Sadurski, Theory of Punishment, Social Justice, and Liberal 
Neutrality, 7 L. & PHIL. 351 (1988); Geoffrey Sayre-McCord, Criminal Justice and Legal Repara-
7
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In civil law, research suggests that apologies provide an astoundingly 
successful means of mollifying disputants.13  Many suggestive social scien-
 
tions as an Alternative to Punishment, 11 PHIL. ISSUES 502 (2001); John Tasioulas, Punishment and 
Repentance, 81 PHIL. 279 (2006); John Tasioulas, Repentance and the Liberal State, 4 OHIO ST. J. 
CRIM. L. 487 (2007); Steven K. Tudor, Accepting One’s Punishment as Meaningful Suffering, 20 L. 
& PHIL. 581 (2000); P. Twambley, Mercy and Forgiveness, 36 ANALYSIS 84 (1976). 
 13. For discussions of apologies in civil law in law reviews and by law faculty, see William K. 
Bartels, The Stormy Sea of Apologies: California Evidence Code Section 1160 Provides a Safe Har-
bor for Apologies Made After Accidents, 28 W. ST. U. L. REV. 141 (2001); Max Bolstad, Learning 
from Japan: The Case for Increased Use of Apology in Mediation, 48 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 545 (2000); 
Jennifer G. Brown, The Role of Apology in Mediation, 87 MARQ. L. REV. 655 (2004); Dai-Kwon 
Choi, Freedom of Conscience and the Court-Ordered Apology for Defamatory Remarks, 8 
CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 205 (2000); Jonathan R. Cohen, Advising Clients to Apologize, 72 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 1009 (1999); Jonathan R. Cohen, Legislating Apologies: The Pros and Cons, 70 U. 
CIN. L. REV. 819 (2002); Ashley A. Davenport, Forgive and Forget: Recognition of Error and Use 
of Apology as Preemptive Steps to ADR or Litigation in Medical Malpractice Cases, 6 PEPP. DISP. 
RESOL. L.J. 81 (2006); Robin Ebert, Attorneys, Tell Your Clients to Say They’re Sorry: Apologies in 
the Health Care Industry, 5 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 337 (2008); Carole S. Houk & Lauren M. Edel-
stein, Beyond Apology to Early Non-Judicial Resolution: The Medicom Program as a Patient Safety-
Focused Alternative to Malpractice Litigation, 29 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 411 (2008); David 
Hyman & Charles Silver, Medical Malpractice Litigation and Tort Reform: It’s the Incentive, Stu-
pid, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1085 (2006); Colin Jones, Apologies and Corporate Governance in the Japa-
nese Context: Tatsumi Tanaka’s Sonna Shazai De Wa Kaisha Ga Abunai (Apologizing that Way Will 
Endanger Your Company), 3 BYU INT’L L. MGMT. REV. 303 (2007); Sidney Kanazawa, Apologies 
and Lunch: Strategic Options for Every Litigator, FOR THE DEFENSE, Jul. 2004, at 29; Steven Keeva, 
Does Law Mean Never Having to Say You’re Sorry?, 85 A.B.A. J. 64 (1999); Russell Korobkin & 
Chris Guthrie, Psychological Barriers to Litigation Settlement: An Experimental Approach, 93 
MICH. L. REV. 107 (1994); Elizabeth Latif, Apologetic Justice: Evaluating Apologies Tailored To-
ward Legal Solutions, 81 B.U. L. REV. 289 (2001); Aaron Lazare, The Healing Forces of Apology in 
Medical Practice and Beyond, 57 DEPAUL L. REV. 251 (2008); Ilhyung Lee, The Law and Culture of 
the Apology in Korean Dispute Settlement (with Japan and the United States in Mind), 27 MICH. J. 
INT’L L. 1 (2005); Deborah L. Levi, The Role of Apology in Mediation, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1165 
(1997); Virginia L. Morrison, Heyoka: The Shifting Shape of Dispute Resolution in Health Care, 21 
GA. ST. U. L. REV. 931 (2005); Erin O’Hara & Douglas Yarn, On Apology and Consilience, 77 
WASH. L. REV. 1121 (2002); Aviva Orenstein, Apology Excepted: Incorporating a Feminist Analysis 
into Evidence Policy Where You Would Least Expect It, 28 SW. U. L. REV. 221 (1999); Donna L. 
Pavlick, Apology and Mediation: The Horse and Carriage of the Twenty-First Century, 18 OHIO ST. 
J. ON DISP. RESOL. 829 (2003); Peter H. Rehm & Denise R. Beatty, Legal Consequences of Apolo-
gizing, 1995 J. DISP. RESOL. 115 (1996); Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Apologies and Legal Settlement: 
An Empirical Examination, 102 MICH. L. REV. 460 (2003); Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Apologies and 
Medical Error, 467 CLIN. ORTHOP. RELAT. RES. 376 (2009); Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Apologies and 
Reasonableness: Some Implications of Psychology to Torts, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 489 (2010); Jen-
nifer K. Robbenolt, Apologies and Settlement, CT. REV. (forthcoming); Jennifer K. Robbennolt, 
Apologies and Settlement Levers, 3 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 333 (2006); Jennifer K. Robbennolt, 
Attorneys, Apologies, and Settlement Negotiation, 13 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 349 (2008); Jennifer K. 
Robbennolt, What We Know and Don’t About the Role of Apologies in Resolving Health Care Dis-
putes, 21 GA. ST. L. REV. 1009 (2005); Michael Runnels, Apologies All Around: Advocating Federal 
Protection for the Full Apology in Civil Cases, 46 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 137 (2009); Daniel W. Shu-
man, Role of Apologies in Tort Law, 83 JUDICATURE 180 (2000); John Soloski, The Study and the 
Libel Plaintiff: Who Sues for Libel?, 71 IOWA L. REV. 217 (1985); Mitchell A. Stephens, I’m Sorry: 
Exploring the Reasons Behind the Differing Roles of Apology in American and Japanese Civil Cas-
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tific studies have appeared in the past twenty years, but consider a few of the 
more striking recent arguments for increasing the role of apologies in law.14 
 
es, 14 WIDENER L. REV. 185 (2008); Lee Taft, Apology Subverted: The Commodification of Apolo-
gy, 109 YALE L.J. 1135 (2000); Lee Taft, Apology within a Moral Dialectic: A Reply to Professor 
Robbennolt, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1010 (2005); Prue Vines, Apologising to Avoid Liability: Cynical 
Civility or Practical Morality?, 27 SYDNEY L. REV. 483 (2005); Prue Vines, Apologies in the Civil 
Liability Context, 2 AUSTRALIAN CIV. LIABILITY 6 (2005); Prue Vines, Apologies and Civil Liability 
in the UK: A View from Elsewhere, 12 EDINBURGH L. REV. 200 (2008); Prue Vines, The Power of 
Apology: Mercy, Forgiveness or Corrective Justice in the Civil Liability Arena, PUB. SPACE 1 
(2007); Brent T. White, Say You’re Sorry: Court-Ordered Apologies as a Civil Rights Remedy, 91 
CORNELL L. REV. 1261 (2006); Jonathan R. Cohen, Nagging Problem: Advising the Client Who 
Wants to Apologize, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Spring 1999, at 19; Marshall Tanick & Teresa Ayling, Al-
ternative Dispute Resolution by Apology: Settlement by Saying “I’m Sorry,” HENNEPIN LAWYER, 
Jul.-Aug. 1996, at 22. 
 14. For social scientific discussion of apologies in civil law, see  Johannes Abeler et al., The 
Power of Apology (2009) available at http://www.nottingham.ac.uk/economics/cedex/papers/2009-
12.pdf; Brian H. Bornstein et al., The Effects of Defendant Remorse on Mock Juror Decisions in a 
Malpractice Case, 20 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 393 (2002); Jonathan R. Cohen, Apology and Organiza-
tions: Exploring an Example from Medical Practice, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1447 (2000); Robert M. 
Cornell et al., The Use of Remedial Tactics in Negligence Litigation, 26 U. UTAH CONTEMP. ACCTG. 
RES. 767 (2009); Henry S. Farber & Michael J. White, A Comparison of Formal and Informal Dis-
pute Resolution in Medical Malpractice, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 777 (1994); Douglas Frenkel & Carol 
Liebman, Words that Heal, 140 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. 482 (2004); Thomas H. Gallagher et 
al., Patients’ and Physicians’ Attitudes Regarding the Disclosure of Medical Errors, 289 J. AM. 
MED. ASS’N 1001 (2003); Stephen B. Goldberg et al., Saying You’re Sorry, 3 NEGOTIATION J. 221 
(1987); John O. Haley, The Implications of Apology, 20 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 499 (1986); Gerald B. 
Hickson et al., Factors that Prompted Families to File Medical Malpractice Claims Following Peri-
natal Injuries, 267 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1359 (1992); Chris Hyman & Clyde Schechter, Mediating 
Medical Malpractice Lawsuits Against Hospitals: New York City’s Pilot Project, 25 HEALTH AFF. 
1394 (2006); Lauris C. Kaldjian et al., An Empirically Derived Taxonomy of Factors Affecting Phy-
sicians’ Willingness to Disclose Medical Errors, 21 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 942 (2006); Ann J. Kel-
lett, Healing Angry Wounds: The Roles of Apology and Mediation in Disputes Between Physicians 
and Patients, 1987 J. DISP. RESOL. 111 (1987); Steve Kraman & Ginny Hamm, Risk Management: 
Extreme Honesty May Be the Best Policy, 131 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 963 (1999); Rae M. Lamb 
et al., Hospital Disclosure Practices: Results of a National Study, 22 HEALTH AFF. 73 (2003); Eliza-
beth Latif, Apologetic Justice: Evaluating Apologies Tailored Toward Legal Solutions, 81 B. U. L. 
REV. 289 (2001); Aaron Lazare, Apology in Medical Practice: An Emerging Clinical Skill, 296 J. 
AM. MED. ASS’N 1401 (2006); Carol Liebman & Chris S. Hyman, A Mediation Skills Model to 
Manage Disclosure of Errors and Adverse Events to Patients, 23 HEALTH AFFAIRS 22 (2004); Mari-
lynn L. May & Daniel B. Stengel, Who Sues Their Doctors? How Patients Handle Medical Griev-
ances, 24 L. & SOC’Y REV. 105 (1990); Kathleen M. Mazor et al., Disclosure of Medical Errors: 
What Factors Influence How Patients Respond?, 21 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 704 (2006); Kathleen 
M. Mazor et al., Health Plan Members’ Views about Disclosure of Medical Errors, 140 ANNALS 
INTERNAL MED. 409 (2004); Dennis Novack et al., Physicians’ Attitudes Toward Using Deception to 
Resolve Difficult Ethical Problems, 261 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 2980 (1989); Ameeta Patel & Lamar 
Reinsch, Companies Can Apologize: Corporate Apologies and Legal Liability, 66 BUS. COMM. Q. 9 
(2003); Michael B. Rainey et al., Characterized by Conciliation: Here’s How Business Can Use 
Apology to Diffuse Litigation, 26 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 131 (2008); Carl D. Schnei-
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Michael Woods, a physician and leading advocate for apologies as a 
means of reducing medical malpractice litigation, claims that the “likelihood 
of a lawsuit falls by 50 percent when an apology is offered and the details of 
a medical error are disclosed immediately.”15  Evidence from nineteen medi-
cal malpractice cases indicated that 91% of cases in which the defendants 
offered an apology settled, while only 38% settled when the defense did not 
apologize.16 Jennifer Robbennolt has reached similar conclusions in her ex-
periments—which distinguish between expressions of sympathy and admis-
sions of wrongdoing—finding that receiving an apology that accepted re-
sponsibility increased the likelihood that a respondent would accept a 
settlement offer by 21%.17 A team at the Nottingham School of Economics’ 
Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics claimed in a 
2009 study that even “cheap talk” apologies—those that should be perceived 
as obviously insincere calculations performed by professional “apologists 
whose job is to say sorry to customers who have a grievance”—brought con-
siderable benefit to the apologizer.  According to this study, 45% of the ag-
grieved parties withdrew their complaints after receiving an electronic apol-
ogy, while only 23% withdrew their complaints upon being offered cash 
payment to withdraw their grievance.18  Still another 2009 paper argues that 
those who apologize for corporate transgressions should pay special atten-
tion to the shape of the spokesperson’s face—a “baby face” is best for minor 
offenses, but a mature face better conveys seriousness in light of grave 
 
der, What It Means To Be Sorry: The Power of Apology in Mediation, 17 MEDIATION Q. 265 (2000); 
Catherine A.G. Sparkman, Legislating Apology in the Context of Medical Mistakes, 82 AORN J. 263 
(2005); Amy B. Witman et al., How Do Patients Want Physicians to Handle Mistakes? A Survey of 
Internal Medicine Patients in an Academic Setting, 156 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 2565 (1996); 
Albert W. Wu et al., Disclosing Medical Errors to Patients: It’s Not What You Say, It’s What They 
Hear, 24 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 1012 (2009); Albert Wu, Handling Hospital Errors: Is Disclosure 
the Best Defense?, 131 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 970 (1999); Charles Vincent et al., Why Do People 
Sue Doctors? A Study of Patients and Relatives Taking Legal Action, 343 LANCET 1609 (1994). 
 15. WOODS, supra note 3, at 3. 
 16. See Hyman & Schechter, supra note 14, at 1395 (methodological concerns regarding this 
study are noted in Robbennolt, Attorneys, Apologies, and Settlement Negotiation, supra note 13, at 
359 n.36). 
 17. See Robbennolt, Apologies and Legal Settlement, supra note 13, at 485–86 (“When no 
apology was offered 52% of respondents indicated that they would definitely or probably accept the 
offer, while 43% would definitely or probably reject the offer and 5% were unsure.  When a partial 
apology was offered, only 35% of respondents were inclined to accept the offer, 25% were inclined 
to reject it, and 40% indicated that they were unsure.  In contrast, when a full apology was offered, 
73% of respondents were inclined to accept the offer, with only 13–14% each inclined to reject it or 
remaining unsure.”). 
 18. See Abeler et al., supra note 14, at 233. 
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wrongdoing.19  The tension builds: in one respect apologies seem like an 
admission of defeat antithetical to the practice of adversarial law, but on the 
other hand they continue to develop as a valuable legal strategy. 
Contrary to the arguments I advanced in I Was Wrong, and without any 
serious consideration of the moral features and cultural histories of repent-
ance, various attorneys and legal scholars repeat the assurance that “an apol-
ogy is not synonymous with an admission of guilt or fault” and advise legal 
parties to exploit the ambiguities of apologetic language to their advantage.20  
Another 2009 study claims in this respect that apologizing may lead to fa-
vorable verdicts for accounting auditors accused of wrongdoing, but the au-
thors explicitly claim that apologies express sorrow “without admitting 
guilt.”21  Consider how one partner at a 900-attorney firm captures the rela-
tionship between apologies and guilt: 
Though individuals use apologies to express regret and remorse 
about a negative outcome, an apology is not synonymous with an 
admission of guilt or fault.  When carried out appropriately, an 
apology can exist without an expression of wrongdoing.  In fact, le-
gal research specifically states that defendants may apologize with-
out admitting guilt: First, an apology is not necessarily equivalent to 
the admission of liability.  “I’m sorry” is not the same as “I’m at 
fault.”  “I’m sorry” is polite and human.  Not to say, “I’m sorry” is 
rude and arrogant.  It has nothing to do with fault.  Moreover, “I’m 
sorry” in everyday speech usually means “I’m sorry we find our-
selves in this current situation.”  It is not about fault.22 
Described in this manner, divorcing apologies from admissions of guilt 
seems like a matter of common decency.  This distinction, however, fortifies 
apologies as a tactical defense that “should be part of the arsenal of re-
sources brought to bear in addressing and resolving legal disputes.”23  Attor-
neys can deploy such apologies as an “attitudinal structuring tactic” in order 
to “lubricate settlement discussions” and “influence an opponent’s bargain-
ing behavior.”24  What appears like a gesture of empathy can weaponize 
moral language in legal warfare. 
 
 19. Gerald J. Gorn, Yuwei Jiang & Gita Venkataramani Johar, Babyfaces, Trait Inferences, 
and Company Evaluations in a Public Relations Crisis, 35 J. CONSUMER RES. 36, 37 (2008) (dis-
cussing the effect of facial characteristics on trustworthiness). 
 20. Cornell et al., supra note 14, at 770. 
 21. Id. at 767. 
 22. Kanazawa, supra note 13, at 32. 
 23. Tanick & Ayling, supra note 13. 
 24. Id.; Levi, supra note 2, at 1173. 
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Medicine best embodies these two faces of apologies in law.  Medical 
approaches to litigation underwent a dramatic transformation by evolving 
from an “admit nothing” culture to a profession that routinely advises physi-
cians to apologize for adverse outcomes in order to minimize the costs asso-
ciated with medical malpractice litigation.25  Indeed, apologies have become 
 
 25. For further specific discussions of the role of apologies in medicine, see, e.g., Medical Jus-
tice: Making the System Work Better for Patients and Doctors: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on 
Health, Educ., Labor & Pensions, 109th Cong. 3 (2006) (testimony of Richard C. Boothman); 
WOODS, supra note 3; Abeler et al., supra note 14; Flauren F. Bender, “I’m Sorry” Laws and Medi-
cal Liability, 9 VIRTUAL MENTOR: AM. MED. ASS’N J. ETHICS 300 (2007); Bornstein et al., supra 
note 14; Davenport, supra note 12; Cohen, Apology and Organizations: Exploring an Example from 
Medical Practice, supra note 14; Cohen, Legislating Apologies: The Pros and Cons, supra note 13; 
Cornell et al., supra note 14; Ebert, supra note 13; Farber & White, supra note 13; Frenkel & Lieb-
man, supra note 14; Gallagher et al., supra note 14; Hickson et al., supra note 13; Hyman & 
Schechter, supra note 14; Hyman & Silver, supra note 13; Kaldjian et al., supra note 14; Kellett, 
supra note 13; John Kleefeld, Thinking Like a Human: British Columbia’s Apology Act, 40 U. B.C. 
L. REV. 769 (2007); Kraman & Hamm, supra note 14; Rae M. Lamb, Open Disclosure: The Only 
Approach to Medical Error, 13 QUALITY & SAFETY IN HEALTH CARE 3 (2004), available at 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1758054/pdf/v013p00003.pdf; Lamb et al., supra 
note 14; Latif, supra note 7; Lazare, supra note 13; Lazare, supra note 14; Liebman & Hyman, A 
Mediation Skills Model to Manage Disclosure of Errors and Adverse Events to Patients, supra note 
14; Liebman & Hyman, Medical Error Disclosure, Mediation Skills, and Malpractice Litigation: A 
Demonstration Project in Pennsylvania, supra note 13; May & Stengel, supra note 13; Mazor et al., 
Disclosure of Medical Errors: What Factors Influence How Patients Respond?, supra note 14; Ma-
zor et al., Health Plan Members’ Views about Disclosure of Medical Errors, supra note 13; Morri-
son, supra note 13; Novack et al., supra note 13; Rainey et al., supra note 14; Robbennolt, Apologies 
and Medical Error, supra note 13; Robbenholt, What We Know and Don’t About the Role of Apolo-
gies in Resolving Health Care Disputes, supra note 13; Runnels, supra note 13; Sparkman, supra 
note 14; Lee Taft, Apology and Medical Mistake: Opportunity or Foil?, 14 ANN. HEALTH L. 55 
(2005); Taft, Apology Subverted, supra note 6; Vines, Apologising to Avoid Liability: Cynical Civili-
ty or Practical Morality?, supra note 13; 
Witman et al., supra note 14; Wu, supra note 14; Wu et al., supra note 14; Vincent et al., supra note 
14; 
Young, supra note 13; Richard C. Boothman, Apologies and a Strong Defense at the University of 
Michigan Health System, PHYSICIAN EXECUTIVE, Mar./Apr. 2006, at 7; Peter Geier, Emerging Med-
Mal Strategy: “I’m Sorry,” NAT’L L. J., Jul. 24, 2006, available at 
http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1153472732197; Laura Landro, The Informed Patient: Doc-
tors Learn to Say “I’m Sorry”: Patients’ Stories of Hospital Errors Serve to Teach Staff, WALL ST. 
J., Jan. 24, 2007, at D5, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB116960074741385710.html; 
Lucian L. Leape, Full Disclosure and Apology—An Idea Whose Time Has Come, PHYSICIAN 
EXECUTIVE, Mar.-Apr. 2006, at 16, available at 
https://ps.mcic.com/appdocs/lps/Full%20Disclosure%20and%20Apology%20by%20L%20Leap%20
-%20Phys%20Exec%202006.pdf; Lucian L. Leape, Understanding the Power of Apology: How Say-
ing “I’m Sorry” Helps Heal Patients and Caregivers, FOCUS ON PATIENT SAFETY, Winter 2005, at 
1, available at 
https://ps.mcic.com/appdocs/lps/Full%20Disclosure%20and%20Apology%20by%20L%20Leap%20
-%20Phys%20Exec%202006.pdf; Katherine Mangan, Acting Sick, CHRON. HIGHER EDU., Sept. 15, 
2006, at 8, available at http://chronicle.com/article/Acting-Sick/5120; Kevin Sack, Doctors Say “I’m 
Sorry” Before “See You in Court,” N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 2008, at A1, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/18/us/18apology.html?pagewanted=all; Charlie Schmidt, “We’re 
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so institutionalized in law that many states now provide evidentiary “safe 
havens” for certain types of apologies, with some of these laws explicitly 
encouraging physicians to offer gestures of contrition in the hope that apolo-
getic doctors will be sued less and thereby advance the objectives of tort re-
form.26  Prompted by a legislator who sought an apology from the driver 
who struck and killed his daughter, Massachusetts’s version of this statute 
provides that statements or writings expressing 
sympathy or a general sense of benevolence relating to the pain, 
suffering or death of a person involved in an accident and made to 
such person or to the family of such person shall be inadmissible as 
evidence of an admission of liability in a civil action.27 
 
Sorry”: The Healing Power of Apology—And How Two Little Words Can Make Medicine Safer, 
HARV. PUB. HEALTH REV., Fall 2007, at 8; Gail Garfinkel Weiss, Should You Apologize?, MEDICAL 
ECONOMICS, Apr. 21, 2006, at 50, available at 
http://medicaleconomics.modernmedicine.com/memag/content/printContentPopup.jsp?id=319420; J. 
Stratton Shartel, Toro’s Mediation Program Challenges Wisdom of Traditional Litigation Model, 
INSIDE LITIG., June 2005, at 10, available at 
http://www.adrprocess.com/images/20071107094925439.pdf; Lindsey Tanner, Doctors Eye Apolo-
gies for Medical Mistakes, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Nov. 8, 2004 available at 
http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P1-102175283; Rachel Zimmerman, Medical Contrition: Doctors’ 
New Tool to Fight Lawsuits: Saying “I’m Sorry,” WALL ST. J., May 18, 2004, at A1, available at 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB108482777884713711.html; 
See also SORRY WORKS!, http://www.sorryworks.net/ (last visited Oct. 19, 2012). 
For examples of recent media coverage of the increasing role of apologies in medicine, see Sack, 
supra note 25; Landro, supra note 25; Mangan, supra note 25; Geier, supra note 25; Weiss, supra 
note 25. 
 26. See NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, 2007 State Medical Malpractice 
Action: Medical Malpractice Tort Reform (Feb. 8, 2007), 
http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=16214.  In addition to the literature discussing apologies in 
civil law generally, for examples of further specific discussions of “safe apology legislation”, see 
Bartels, supra note 13; Bender, supra note 25; Cohen, Advising Clients to Apologize, supra note 4; 
Cohen, Legislating Apologies: The Pros and Cons, supra note 13; Cohen, Nagging Problem, supra 
note 13; Edward A. Dauer, Apology in the Aftermath of Injury: Colorado’s “I’m Sorry” Law, 34 
COLO. L. 47 (2005); Keeva, supra note 13; Orenstein, supra note 13; Peter Rehm & Denise Beatty, 
supra note 13; Runnels, supra note 13; Sparkman, supra note 14; Taft, Apology Subverted: The 
Commodification of Apology, supra note 6; Vines, Apologies and Civil Liability in the UK: A View 
from Elsewhere, supra note 13. 
 27. For all of the notes identifying relevant legislation, I aggregated findings of various au-
thors working in the area and added them to my own findings.  Particular thanks to Jennifer Robben-
nolt for identifying many of these statutes in her excellent articles. 
For examples of various forms of “safe apology” legislation, see ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2605 
(2005) (“Any statement, affirmation, gesture or conduct expressing apology, responsibility, liability, 
sympathy, commiseration, condolence, compassion or a general sense of benevolence that was made 
by a health care provider . . . to the patient, a relative of the patient, the patient’s survivors or a health 
care decision maker for the patient and that relates to the discomfort, pain, suffering, injury or death 
of the patient as the result of the unanticipated outcome of medical care is inadmissible as evidence 
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of an admission of liability or as evidence of an admission against interest.”); CAL. EVID. CODE § 
1160(a) (West 2009) (expressions of sympathy are inadmissible in proving liability, unless they are 
accompanied by a statement of fault); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-25-135 (2003) (expressions of apolo-
gy or fault are inadmissible as evidence of liability); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-184d (2006) (expres-
sions of apology or fault are inadmissible as evidence of liability); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 4318 
(2006) (expressions of apology, except expressions of liability or fault, are inadmissible as evidence 
of liability); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.4026(2) (West 2010) (expressions of sympathy or benevolence, 
except a statement of fault, are inadmissible as evidence in a civil action); GA. CODE ANN. § 24-3-
37.1 (2006) (all expressions of “benevolence, regret, apology, sympathy, commiseration, condo-
lence, compassion, mistake, error, or a general sense of benevolence . . . shall be inadmissible as 
evidence and shall not constitute an admission of liability” because sympathy and apology should be 
encouraged); Rule 409.5, HAW. R. EVID. Ch. 626, HAW. REV. STAT. (2010) (expressions of sympa-
thy are not admissible as evidence to prove liability, but an apology that “acknowledges or implies 
guilt” is admissible); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 9-207 (2010) (expressions of apology, except statements 
of fault, are inadmissible for any reason); IOWA CODE § 622.31 (1998) (expressions of sympathy or 
sorry that relate to “an alleged breach of the applicable standard of care is inadmissible as evi-
dence”); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-43.5-1 (West 2010) (communications of sympathy, except statements 
of fault, are inadmissible in court); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:3715.5 (2005) (expressions of apolo-
gy, except statements of fault, are inadmissible as evidence); MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch. 233, § 23D 
(1999) (expressions of sympathy are inadmissible as evidence of liability); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 
24, § 2907 (2005) (expressions of apology, except statements of fault, are inadmissible to prove lia-
bility); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 10-920 (2004) (expressions of apology, except admis-
sions of liability or fault, are inadmissible to prove liability); MONT. CODE. ANN. § 26-1-814 (2005) 
(expressions of apology are not admissible for any reason in malpractice actions); MO. REV. STAT. § 
538.229 (2007) (expressions of sympathy, except admissions of fault, are inadmissible as evidence 
of liability); NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-1201 (2007) (expressions of apology, except statements of fault, 
are inadmissible to prove liability); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507-E:4 (2005) (expressions of sympa-
thy, except statements of “culpable conduct,” are inadmissible to prove liability); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 
8C-1, Rule 413 (2004) (“Statements by a health care provider apologizing for an adverse outcome in 
medical treatment, offers to undertake corrective or remedial treatment or actions, and gratuitous 
acts to assist affected persons shall not be admissible to prove negligence or culpable conduct by the 
health care provider.”); N.D. CENT. CODE § 31-04-12 (2007) (expressions of apology are not admis-
sible to prove liability); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.43 (Lexis Nexis 2010) (expressions of apolo-
gy are not admissible to prove liability); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-1708.1H (West 2010) (ex-
pressions of apology are not admissible to prove liability); OR. REV. STAT. § 677.082 (2003) (“[A]ny 
expression of regret or apology. . . does not constitute an admission of liability for any purpose.”); 
S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-1-190 (2009) (“[C]onduct, statements, or activity constituting voluntary offers 
of assistance or expressions of benevolence, regret, mistake, error, sympathy, or apology between or 
among parties or potential parties to a civil action should be encouraged and should not be consid-
ered an admission of liability.”); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 19-12-14 (2005) (“No statement made by a 
health care provider apologizing for an adverse outcome in medical treatment, no offer to undertake 
corrective or remedial treatment or action, and no gratuitous act to assist affected persons is admissi-
ble to prove negligence by the health care provider.”); TENN. R. EVID. § 409.1 (2010) (expressions 
of sympathy, except statements of fault, are inadmissible to prove liability); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. 
CODE ANN. 18.061(a) (1) (West 2010) (expressions of sympathy, except those relating to “culpable 
conduct,” are inadmissible in court); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-14-18 (2010) (expressions of apology 
are inadmissible as evidence); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1912 (2010) (“An oral expression of regret 
or apology. . . made by or on behalf of a health care provider or health care facility, that is provided 
within 30 days of when the provider or facility knew or should have known of the consequences of 
the error, does not constitute a legal admission of liability for any purpose and shall be inadmissi-
ble.”); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.20:1 (2010) (apologies, except statements of fault, are not admis-
sible to prove liability); WASH. REV. CODE § 5.66.010(1) (2010) (expressions of sympathy, except 
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As argued throughout I Was Wrong, however, there is an essential dis-
tinction between mere expressions of sympathy and categorical apologies 
admitting wrongdoing.  Whether spoken by a convict or a practicing physi-
cian, a sympathetic expression that “I am sorry your daughter died” conveys 
a distinct moral substance from an admission that “I deserve blame for kill-
ing your daughter.”  While this distinction may seem rather obvious upon 
reflection, legislators, attorneys, and academics routinely describe such ex-
pressions of sympathy as “apologies.”  Even “safe apology” legislation 
sends mixed messages, with some states protecting only expressions of sym-
pathy,28 while others protect various sorts of admissions of wrongdoing.29  
Some statutes only apply to cases of medical error.30  Other states provided 
general protection for apologies while leaving the term ambiguous.31  While 
confused and contested definitions pervade even our most sophisticated pub-
lic discussions of apologies, apologies become an increasingly common fea-
ture of corporate culture.  Southwest Airlines, for instance, employs a full 
time “apology officer” who sends out roughly 20,000 letters—which all in-
clude his direct phone number—to dissatisfied customers per year.32  Rec-
ognizing that this will prove a very difficult undertaking, this article seeks to 
bring some clarity to the moral meanings and social values of apologies 
within this confounding environment. 
C. A History of the Tension 
It is possible to track the tensions in current legal trends regarding con-
trition to the linguistic and cultural histories of apologies in law.  Given the 
dearth of analyses of apologies in Western philosophical traditions, it is es-
 
statements of fault, are inadmissible as evidence); W. VA. CODE § 55-7-11(a) (2005) (expressions of 
apology are not admissible to prove liability); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-1-130 (2010) (expressions of 
apology are inadmissible to prove liability). 
 28. See, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE § 1160(a) (2001); FLA. STAT. § 90.4026(2) (2001); TENN. R. 
EVID. § 409.1 (2003); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 18.061 (1999); WASH. REV. CODE § 
5.66.010(1) (2008). 
 29. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-25-135 (2003); GA. CODE ANN. § 24-3-37.1 (2006). 
 30. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-25-135 (2003); GA. CODE ANN. § 24-3-37.1 (2006); 735 
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/8-1901 (2005); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.43 (2004); OKLA. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 63, § 1-1708.1H (2004); OR. REV. STAT. § 677.082 (2003); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-1-130 
(2004). 
 31. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.43 (2004); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-
1708.1H (2004); OR. REV. STAT. § 677.082 (2003); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-1-130 (2004). 
 32. Jeff Bailey, Airlines Learn to Fly on a Wing and an Apology, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 2007, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/18/business/18sorry.html. 
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pecially ironic that so many introductory philosophy courses begin with Pla-
to’s Apology.33  Socrates is anything but apologetic as the term has come to 
be understood.  Instead, he provides an apologia (απολογια), as was custom-
ary in the classical Greek legal system, in rebuttal to the prosecution’s accu-
sations.  Rather than accepting blame or even expressing sympathy, Socra-
tes’ legal apology argues for his innocence and righteousness.  Apologia still 
finds use in this sense of offering a defense of one’s position, and the field of 
apologetics has come to be associated with the long tradition of defending 
and reinforcing religious doctrine—particularly Christian beliefs—through 
argumentation.  In modern parlance, we consider an “apologist” to be a sort 
of spokesperson who promotes and defends causes by using various rhetori-
cal strategies to spin facts and influence an audience, sometimes performing 
this service for pay.  The modern use of apology as an admission of wrong-
doing rather than a defense seems to have gained momentum around the six-
teenth century, when Shakespeare used it in Richard III to imply a kind of 
regret.34 
Thus, even the etymology of apology pulls in two directions.  On the 
one hand, we associate apologizing with repentance, confession, remorse, 
blame, and moral defenselessness.  On the other hand, a considerable period 
 
 33. For discussions of apologies, repentance, and related matters in the history of philosophy, 
see KANT, supra note 12; JOHN LANGSHAW AUSTIN, HOW TO DO THINGS WITH WORDS (1962); 
MOSES MAIMONIDES, HILCHOT TESHUVAH: THE LAWS OF REPENTANCE (1987); MICHEL DE 
MONTAIGNE, APOLOGY FOR RAYMOND SEBOND (M. A. Screech trans., Penguin Books 1988); 
Michel de Montaigne, Of Repentance, in MONTAIGNE: ESSAYS 235 (John M. Cohen ed., Penguin 
Books 1993); JOHN SEARLE, SPEECH ACTS: AN ESSAY IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE (1969); 
John Searle, A Classification of Illocutionary Acts, 5 LANG. IN SOC’Y 1 (1976). 
For extended conversations about apologies in philosophical literature in addition to I Was Wrong, 
see generally BENNETT, THE APOLOGY RITUAL, supra note 12; R.A. DUFF, TRIALS AND 
PUNISHMENTS (1986); Jeffrie Murphy, Repentance, Punishment, and Mercy, in REPENTANCE: A 
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (Amitai Etzioni & David Carney eds., 1997); RADZIK, MAKING 
AMENDS: ATONEMENT IN MORALITY, LAW, AND POLITICS, supra note 12; MARGARET URBAN 
WALKER, MORAL REPAIR (2006); Luc Bovens, Apologies, 108 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN SOC’Y. 219 
(2008); Paul Davis, On Apologies, 19 J. APPL. PHIL. 169 (2002); Kathleen Gill, The Moral Functions 
of an Apology, 31 PHIL. F. 11 (2000); Trudy Govier & Wilhelm Verwoerd, Taking Wrongs Serious-
ly: A Qualified Defense of Public Apologies, 65 SASKATCHEWAN L. REV. 157 (2002); Trudy Govier 
& Wilhelm Verwoerd, The Promise and Pitfalls of Apology, 33 J. SOC. PHIL. 67 (2002); Jean Har-
vey, The Emerging Practice of Institutional Apologies, 9 INT’L J. APPL. PHIL. 57 (1995); Richard 
Joyce, Apologizing, 13 PUB. AFF. Q. 159 (1999); Nicolaus Mills, The New Culture of Apology, 
DISSENT 113 (Fall 2001); Louis Kort, What is an Apology? 1 PHIL. RES. ARCHIVES 78 (1975); Glen 
Pettigrove, Apology, Reparations, and the Question of Inherited Guilt, 17 PUB. AFF. Q. 319 (2003); 
Glen Pettigrove, Unapologetic Forgiveness, 41 AM. PHIL. Q. 187 (2004); Jana Thompson, The 
Apology Paradox, 55 PHIL. Q. 470 (2000); Bruce Waller, Sincere Apology without Moral Responsi-
bility, 33 SOC. THEORY & PRAC. 441 (2007); John Wilson, Why Forgiveness Requires Repentance, 
63 PHIL. 534 (1988). 
 34. See generally MARION OWEN, APOLOGIES AND REMEDIAL INTERCHANGES: A STUDY OF 
LANGUAGE USE IN SOCIAL INTERACTIONS (1985). 
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of history understood the practice precisely as a defense.  A third convention 
came into usage around 1754 and defined “apology” and “sorry” as a poor 
substitute, as in a “sorry excuse for a friendship” or “crackers served as but 
an apology for dinner.”  The Oxford English Dictionary recognizes each of 
these forms as acceptable definitions of “apology.”35  Given this plurality of 
occasionally competing meanings, consider the complex role of an attorney 
acting as a paid apologist in the old sense, as she instructs her client to offer 
something like an apology in the modern sense, because this may be her best 
rhetorical strategy for the optimal legal outcome.  Now imagine the attorney 
carefully calibrating the apology to avoid admitting wrongdoing, to maxim-
ize the strategic benefit of her client appearing to have undergone a moral 
transformation, while minimizing legal exposure.  I suspect that parties to 
such claims suffer considerable uncertainty about the meaning of such 
“apologetic” exchanges.  The legal landscape becomes still more abstruse 
when we appreciate that most criminal cases result in pleas and most civil 
cases result in settlements.  A public apology within formal sentencing pro-
ceedings presents different issues than, for example, a confidential statement 
of contrition protected by settlement agreement.  Thus, various legal parties 
may hold very different understandings of the meanings of an apology on 
the table, and the public may have another reading altogether. 
These legal and cultural environments continually co-evolve.  Legal in-
stitutions and strategies structure our conceptions of the moral components 
of apologies, and our moral traditions of apologizing for blameworthy be-
havior shape our legal practices.  This dialectical interplay between moral 
norms and legal institutions requires us to make sense of apologies as they 
transform from the ancient notion of a legal defense to the modern notion of 
contrition for wrongdoing, but then occasionally return to their roots as a 
kind of concealed legal, political, or personal rhetorical stratagem.  Given 
that so many of our conversations about our deepest values occur in the con-
text of apologizing and so many offenses within modern culture become le-
 
 35. The 2005 edition provides the following definitions of apology: 
1. The pleading off from a charge or imputation, whether expressed, implied, or only 
conceived as possible; defence of a person, or vindication of an institution, etc., from ac-
cusation or aspersion; 2. Less formally: Justification, explanation, or excuse, of an inci-
dent or course of action; 3. An explanation offered to a person affected by one’s action 
that no offence was intended, coupled with the expression of regret for any that may have 
been given; or, a frank acknowledgement of the offence with expression of regret for it, 
by way of reparation; 4. Something which, as it were, merely appears to apologize for the 
absence of what ought to have been there; a poor substitute. 
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gal disputes, the feedback between apologies and law resonates throughout 
modern moral discourse. 
I do not wish to overstate the significance of apologies in law, and sure-
ly some gestures of contrition have only a very distant relationship to legal 
proceedings.  If one doubts the law’s influence over our culture of apologies, 
however, place any example from I Was Wrong within the context of the 
victim having already brought a legal claim of some sort against the offend-
er.  Consider, for instance, the fictional example used in I Was Wrong re-
garding a twelve-member philosophy department attempting to apologize for 
allegations of sexism in faculty behavior and in the curriculum.  The specter 
of litigation would haunt discussions, even if no one had threatened to bring 
a claim—sexual harassment or otherwise—and even if the faculty were cer-
tain they had not violated any laws.  Similarly, notice how the fear that an 
apology may void insurance coverage influences interactions at the scene of 
an automobile accident or how extra thought might be given to the wording 
of an apology for infidelity, if one party might use it against the apologizing 
party in divorce proceedings.  People often act as if they expect the lawyers 
circling overhead to descend at the first sign of contrition, and this can have 
a chilling effect on apologetic discourse and everyday moral interactions. 
For some, what might be described as the commodification of apologies 
contributes to a skeptical attitude toward the moral legitimacy of law.  Take 
the true case of a woman who was fired from her job days after she informed 
her employers that she was pregnant.  After being advised that she had a 
strong case for wrongful termination, the prospect of bringing a legal claim 
repulsed her.  As a woman of strong moral convictions, she felt she had been 
wronged.  She had been objectified.  She had been mistreated because of her 
gender, and even her unborn child had been disrespected.  Converting such 
moral injuries into legal claims—and ultimately into a cash award—seemed 
loathsome to her.  Although she could have used the money, it could not 
provide her with the meaning she sought.  From her perspective, only a full 
apology in which her employers admitted their wrongdoing and promised 
never to repeat the offense would satisfy her.  She doubted that legal re-
course could help her because of its overriding concern with money.  Instead 
of helping her redress what she perceived primarily as moral offense, she be-
lieved lawyers would prostitute her injury.  She did not bring a claim. 
With all of this in mind, one can appreciate the complexities of finding 
these highly nuanced rituals of contrition within the labyrinths of modern 
legal institutions and the peculiarities of modern culture.  Just Apologies at-
tempts not only to make explicit the various kinds of hidden meaning in acts 
of contrition by legal actors, but also to empower those parties by providing 
them with tools to evaluate the apologies given and received in law and law-
like environments.  In this regard, Just Apologies will have the theoretical 
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precision expected by philosophers, while offering the type of practical 
analysis that speaks to judges, legislators, attorneys, advocates, and litigants. 
This article will now outline what are regarded as the central questions 
for the study of apologies in criminal law, setting aside discussions of apolo-
gies in law.  After briefly summarizing my account of categorical apologies 
in Section II, I will sketch an overview of problems for apologies in criminal 
law in Section III and civil law in Section IV.  Section V will briefly pre-
view issues related to collective apologies in law. 
II. THE CATEGORICAL APOLOGY REVISITED 
Much of I Was Wrong is devoted to the inexact science of identifying 
the distinct spheres of apologetic meaning.  The book considers a wide va-
riety of apologetic meanings and warns against thinking of apologies in bi-
nary “all or nothing” terms, but the following benchmarks guide the stand-
ards for categorical apologies and can serve as touchstones for our thinking 
about apologies in law.  Categorical apologies, understood as a regulative 
ideal for acts of contrition, address the following concerns: 
1. Corroborated Factual Record: a categorical apology will corroborate 
a detailed factual record of the events salient to the injury, reaching agree-
ment among the victim, offender, and sometimes the community regarding 
what transpired.  The parties will also agree regarding what amounts to such 
salient events, leading them to share an understanding of the relevant aspects 
of the context in which the injury occurs.  Rather than providing general and 
vague descriptions of the events (“I acted badly”), the record will render 
transparent all facts material to judging the transgressions.  Such a record 
will often include honest accounts of the mental states of the apologizer at 
the time of the offense when such information would prove relevant, for ex-
ample by describing the offender’s intentions when committing the trans-
gression. 
2. Acceptance of Blame: in accordance with notions of proximate causa-
tion, the offender accepts causal moral responsibility and blame for the harm 
at issue.  We can distinguish this from expressing sympathy for the injury or 
describing the injury as accidental or unintentional. 
3. Possession of Appropriate Standing: the categorical apologizer will 
possess the requisite standing to accept blame for the wrongdoing.  The of-
fender can and does accept proximate responsibility for the harm and she—
rather than a proxy or other third party—undertakes the work of apologizing 
described herein. 
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4. Identification of Each Harm: the offender will identify each harm, 
taking care not to conflate several harms into one general harm or apologize 
for only a lesser offense or the “wrong wrong.” 
5. Identification of the Moral Principles Underlying Each Harm: the of-
fender will identify the moral principles underlying these harms with an ap-
propriate degree of specificity, thus making explicit the values at stake in the 
interaction. 
6. Shared Commitment to Moral Principles Underlying Each Harm: the 
offender will commit to the moral principles underlying these harms (again 
with an appropriate degree of specificity), vindicating the value at issue and 
finding the victim’s offense at the apologizer’s breach of this value justified.  
Here the phrase “I was wrong” will better convey this meaning than the tra-
ditionally favored “I am sorry,” as the former accepts personal blame for 
wrongdoing while the latter may provide no more than an expression of 
sympathy or a displeasure with a state of affairs. 
7. Recognition of Victim as Moral Interlocutor: through this process the 
offender comes to recognize and treat the victim as a moral interlocutor.  
The offender treats the victim as a moral agent worthy of engaging in moral 
discourse and abandons the belief that she can disregard the victim’s dignity, 
humanity, or worth in pursuit of her own objectives. 
8. Categorical Regret: the offender categorically regrets the actions in 
question, meaning she believes that she has made a mistake that she wishes 
she could undo.  We can distinguish this from continuing to endorse one’s 
decisions while expressing sympathy regarding what the offender perceives 
as the justifiable consequences of her actions. 
9. Performance of the Apology: the offender expresses the apology to 
the victim rather than keeping her thoughts of contrition to herself or sharing 
them only with a third party such as a judge or member of the clergy.  She 
addresses the apology to the victim as a moral interlocutor.  She expresses 
the content required of a categorical apology explicitly.  The apology reach-
es the victim.  The victim may exercise reasonable discretion regarding 
whether the offender must present the apology only to the victim or also to a 
broader community.  The determination whether the apology must be com-
mitted to writing and conferred to her also lies within the victim’s reasona-
ble discretion. 
10. Reform and Redress: the apologizer will reform and forbear from 
reoffending over her lifetime and will repeatedly demonstrate this commit-
ment by resisting opportunities and temptations to reoffend.  Thus, a cate-
gorical apology allows the victim to isolate the cause of her suffering, appor-
tion blame for her injury, and feel secure in the offender’s pledge never to 
repeat the offense.  The apologizer accepts legal sanctions for her wrongs, 
though she may protest these penalties to the extent that she finds them un-
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justifiable as disproportionate to her offense.  The offender takes practical 
responsibility for the harm she causes, providing commensurate remedies 
and other incommensurable forms of redress to the best of her ability.  The 
offender provides a proportional amount of redress, but she need not meet 
excessive demands from victims with unreasonable or inappropriate expec-
tations.  Questions regarding what constitutes unreasonable or excessive 
demands will be determined with consideration of cultural practices, even 
though such deliberations will often be contentious. 
11. Intentions for Apologizing: the categorical apology also requires cer-
tain mental states.  Rather than promoting the apologizer’s purely self-
serving objectives, the offender intends the apology to advance the victim’s 
well-being and affirm the breached value. 
12. Emotions: as a result of her wrongdoing, the apologizer will experi-
ence an appropriate degree and duration of sorrow and guilt as well as empa-
thy and sympathy for the victim.  Questions regarding what constitutes the 
appropriate qualitative and quantitative emotional components of categorical 
apologies are to be determined with consideration of cultural practices and 
individual expectations. 
 
Each of these positions is defended at length in I Was Wrong.  Con-
ceived as such, categorical apologies are demanding ethical acts indicating a 
kind of transformation that resonates with thick conceptions of repentance 
within religious traditions.  We should recognize when apologies fall short 
of this standard and pursue their full meaning or understand them as less 
than categorical.  This is not to say that all apologies must be categorical, or 
that all noncategorical apologies are meaningless, insincere, inauthentic, or 
otherwise deficient for their purposes.  The author of I Was Wrong detailed 
and classified many kinds of apologies, and the categorical apology offers 
but one possible arrangement of such meanings.36  These principles identi-
fied in the categorical apology should, however, help us organize our think-
ing as we consider the role of apologies in law. 
Apologies, in the author’s view, present genuinely interdisciplinary 
questions and no single methodology corners the market on insights in this 
 
 36. The classification systems for reconciliation developed by social scientists like Jens Mei-
erhenrich are also valuable in this regard; see Jens Meierhenrich, Varieties of Reconciliation, 33 L. & 
SOC. INQUIRY 195 (2008) (discussing the concept of reconciliation in the new conceptualization 
framework). 
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field.37  His interest in empirical findings leads to his observation of a signif-
icant limitation of nearly all current social scientific studies of apologies.  
The difficulties of conducting social scientific research on highly nuanced 
and context dependent phenomena, and the methodology used in some of 
this research could be improved.  For example, one finds definitions of apol-
ogies utilized by social scientists too oversimplified to capture significant 
aspects of conciliatory behavior.  Some studies simply “count” utterances of 
the word “sorry” as apologies rather than evaluating the substance of the 
speech act and its meaning in context.38  Such findings will not distinguish 
 
 37. I should note here the relationship between the author’s theories and various empirical 
studies of apologies.  Throughout this work the author attempts to flag questions that would benefit 
from further empirical research, and makes efforts—to the best of admittedly novice ability—to en-
gage and learn from social scientific literature in a range of fields related to apologies. 
 38. For examples of socio-linguistic discussions of apologies, see APOLOGIES AND REMEDIAL 
INTERCHANGES: A STUDY OF LANGUAGE USE IN SOCIAL INTERACTIONS (1985); WILLIAM BENOIT, 
ACCOUNTS, EXCUSES, AND APOLOGIES: A THEORY OF IMAGE RESTORATION STRATEGIES (1995); 
ANDREW COHEN & ELITE OLSHTAIN, Comparing Apologies Across Languages, in SCI. & HUM. 
DIMENSIONS  LANGUAGE 175 (Kurt Jankowsky ed., 1985); JULIANE HOUSE ET AL., CROSS-
CULTURAL PRAGMATICS: REQUESTS AND APOLOGIES (Gabriele Kasper & Shoshana Blum-Kulka 
eds., 1989); INTERLANGUAGE PRAGMATICS (G. Kasper & S. Blum-Kulka, eds., 1993); OWEN, supra 
note 34; DEBORAH TANNEN, YOU JUST DON’T UNDERSTAND: WOMEN AND MEN IN CONVERSATION 
(1990); Shoshana Blum-Kulka & Elite Olshtain, Requests and Apologies: A Cross-Cultural Study of 
Speech Act Realization Patterns (CCSARP), 5 APPL. LINGUISTICS 196 (1984); Ann Borkin & Susan 
Reinhart, “Excuse me” and “I’m sorry,” 12 TESOL Q. 57 (1978); Andrew Cohen & Elite Olshtain, 
Developing a Measure of Socio-Cultural Competence: The Case of Apology, 31 LANG. LEARNING 
113 (1981); Janet Holmes, Apologies in New Zealand English, 19 LANGUAGE IN SOC. 155 (1990); 
Janet Holmes, Sex Differences and Apologies: One Aspect of Communication Competence, 10 APPL. 
LINGUISTICS 194 (1989); Maxine Lipson, Apologizing in Italian and English, 32 INT’L REV. APPL. 
LINGUISTICS LANG. TEACHING 19 (1994); Albert Mehrabian, Substitute for Apology: Manipulation 
of Cognitions to Reduce Negative Attitude Toward Self, 20 PSYCHOL. REP. 687 (1976); R. R. Mehro-
tra, How to be Polite in Indian English, 116 INT’L J. SOC. LANG. 99 (1995); Malgorzata Susczynska, 
Apologizing in English, Polish and Hungarian: Different Languages, Different Strategies, 31 J. 
PRAGMATICS 1053 (1999); Anna Trosborg, Apology Strategies in NativesNon-natives, 11 J. 
PRAGMATICS 147 (1987). 
For examples of general (distinguished from specific treatments of apologies in law) discussions of 
apologies in psychology, see W. Austin et al., Equity and the Law: The Effects of a Harmdoer’s 
“Suffering in the Act” on Liking and Assigned Punishment, in ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL 
PSYCHOLOGY 217 (L. Berkowitz ed., 1976); AARON LAZARE, ON APOLOGY (2004) (note that Lazare 
is a psychiatrist); C. Ward Struthers et al., The Effects of Attributions of Intent and Apology on For-
giveness: When Sorry May Not Help the Story, 44 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 983 (2008); J. 
T. Tedeschi & C. A. Riordan, Impression Management and Prosocial Behavior Following Trans-
gression, in, IMPRESSION MANAGEMENT THEORY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL RESEARCH 223 (J. 
T. Tedeschi ed., 1981); Robert A. Baron, Attributions and Organizational Conflict: The Mediating 
Role of Apparent Sincerity, 41 ORG. BEHAVIOR & HUMAN DECISION PROCESSES 111 (1988); Mark 
Bennett & Christopher Dewberry, I’ve Said I’m Sorry, Haven’t I? A Study of the Identity Implica-
tions and Constraints That Apologies Create for Their Recipients, 13 CURRENT PSYCHOL. 10 (1994); 
Mark Bennett & Deborah Earwaker, Victims’ Responses to Apologies: The Effects of Offender Re-
sponsibility and Offense Severity, 134 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 457 (1994); Bruce W. Darby & Barry R. 
Schlenker, Children’s Reactions to Apologies, 43 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 742 (1982); 
22
Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal, Vol. 13, Iss. 1 [2013], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/drlj/vol13/iss1/3
[Vol. 13: 35, 2013]  
PEPPERDINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION LAW JOURNAL 
57 
 
Bruce W. Darby & Barry R. Schlenker, Children’s Reactions to Transgressions: Effects of the Ac-
tor’s Apology, Reputation, and Remorse, 28 BRITISH J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 353 (1989); Judy Eaton et al., 
When Apologies Fail: The Moderating Effect of Implicit and Explicit Self-Esteem on Apology and 
Forgiveness, 6 SELF & IDENTITY 209 (2007); Gregg J. Gold & Bernard Weiner, Remorse, Confes-
sion, Group Identity, and Expectancies About Repeating a Transgression, 22 BASIC & APPL. SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 291 (2000); M.H. Gonzales et al., Explaining our Sins: Factors Influencing Offender Ac-
counts and Anticipated Victim Responses, 62 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 958 (1992); M. H. 
Gonzales et al., Victims as “Narrative Critics:” Factors Influencing Rejoinders and Evaluative Re-
sponses to Offenders’ Accounts,” 20 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 691 (1994); Holley S. 
Hodgins & Elizabeth Liebeskind, Apology Versus Defense: Antecedents and Consequences, 39 J. 
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 297 (2003); Holley S. Hodgins et al., Getting out of Hot Water: 
Facework in Social Predicaments, 71 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 300 (1996); Thomas M. 
Holtgraves, The Function and Form of Remedial Moves: Reported Use, Psychological Reality, and 
Perceived Effectiveness, 8 J. LANG.AND SOC. PSYCHOL. 1 (1989); Cynthia McPherson Frantz & 
Courtney Bennigson, Better Late than Early: The Influence of Timing on Apology Effectiveness, 41 
J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 201 (2005); Dale T. Miller, Disrespect and the Experience of In-
justice, 52 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 527 (2001); Ken-ichi Ohbuchi et al., Apology as Aggression Con-
trol: Its Role in Mediating Appraisal of and Response to Harm, 56 J. PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL 
PSYCHOLOGY 219 (1989); Ken-ichi Ohbuchi & Kobun Sato, Children’s Reactions to Mitigating Ac-
counts, 134 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 5 (1994); Jennifer F. Orleans & Michael B. Gurtman, Effects of Physi-
cal Attractiveness and Remorse on Evaluations of Transgressors, 6 ACAD. PSYCHOL. BULL. 49 
(1984); Carrie Petrucci, Apology in the Criminal Justice Setting, 20 BEHAVIORAL SCI. & L. 337 
(2002); Jane L. Risen & Thomas Gilovich, Target and Observer Differences in the Acceptance of 
Questionable Apologies, 92 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 418 (2007); Daniel P. Scarlicki et al., 
When Social Accounts Backfire: The Exacerbating Effects of a Polite Message or an Apology on 
Reactions to an Unfair Outcome, 34 J. APPL. SOC. PSYCHOL. 322 (2004); Steven J. Scher & John M. 
Darley, How Effective Are the Things People Say to Apologize? Effects of the Realization of the 
Apology Speech Act, 26 J. PSYCHOLINGUISTIC RES. 127 (1997); Barry R. Schlenker & Michael F. 
Weigold, Interpersonal Processes Involving Impression Regulation and Management, 43 ANN. REV. 
PSYCHOL. 133 (1992); Barry Schlenker & Bruce W. Darby, The Use of Apologies in Social Predic-
aments, 44 SOC. PSYCHOL. Q. 271 (1981); G. S. Schwartz et al., The Effects of Post-Transgression 
Remorse on Perceived Aggression, Attribution of Intent, and Level of Punishment, 17 J. SOC. & 
CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 293 (1987); Seiji Takaku, The Effects of Apology and Perspective Taking on 
Interpersonal Forgiveness: A Dissonance-Attribution Model of Interpersonal Forgiveness, 141 J. 
SOC. PSYCHOL. 494 (2001); Bernard Weiner et al., Public Confession and Forgiveness, 50 J. 
PERSONALITY 281 (1991). 
For examples of general discussions of apologies in sociology, see NICHOLAS TAVUCHIS, MEA 
CULPA: A SOCIOLOGY OF APOLOGY AND RECONCILIATION (1991) (the most frequently cited work 
by a sociologist on apologies); see also ERVING GOFFMAN, RELATIONS IN PUBLIC (1971); CHARLES 
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between expressions of sympathy and admissions of blameworthiness and 
therefore do not account for significant variance in meaning between the ut-
terances.  Deborah Tannen’s widely cited claim that women apologize more 
frequently than men is a related issue that was considered in I Was Wrong.  
Tannen’s claim may be true and there are many intuitive reasons to suspect 
that she is correct, but we can appreciate how such research would benefit 
from revising the concepts upon which they build their studies.39  Jennifer 
Robbennolt has become the leading figure in the empirical study of apolo-
gies in law—indeed, she is a rare contributor of original empirical data in 
law reviews—and she has made considerable contributions to our under-
standings of how legal actors understand apologies in both civil and criminal 
settings.  Robbennolt’s evenhanded evaluation of existing social scientific 
literature as well as her own findings pays close attention to distinctions be-
tween expressions of sympathy and admissions of guilt, and she explains the 
limits of her findings with some care.40  From this author’s view, however, 
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ness to Reconcile Following a Broken Promise, 30 J. MGMT. 165, 171 (2004). 
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even Robbennolt’s definitions create a blind spot in this literature precisely 
where one most wants to see. 
Following sociologist Nicolas Tavuchis, Robbennolt claims that an 
“apology is a statement offered by a wrongdoer that expresses acknowledg-
ment of the legitimacy of the violated rule, admission of fault and responsi-
bility for its violation, and the expression of genuine regret and remorse for 
the harm done.”41  From this definition, Robbennolt asks her subjects to re-
spond to this example of a “full apology”: “I want to let you know how sorry 
I am.  The accident was my fault.  I was going too fast and not watching 
where I was going until it was too late.  I am so sorry.”42  This example cap-
tures the distinction between an expression of sympathy and an acceptance 
of blame, but notice how various sorts of meaning that I Was Wrong identi-
fies as significant for a categorical apology operate beyond the scope of such 
a study.  Most importantly, the example meant to illustrate a full apology 
tells us almost nothing about reform, redress, or other future behavior.43  On 
Robbennolt’s account, the offender could provide no redress for the injury 
and commit the same offense the following day and this would have no bear-
ing on whether the apology is “full” or otherwise.  The offender could re-
main unreformed and untrustworthy, yet receive full credit by Robbennolt’s 
measurements.  This would seem to be more than a technicality.  If a prose-
cutor attempts to evaluate a defendant’s contrition during plea allocutions or 
if a judge weighs a convict’s statement of remorse at sentencing, the rela-
tionship between the specific elements of the apology and the likelihood of 
recidivism should be one of their primary concerns.  In civil matters, we will 
want to distinguish between an apology from a hospital in response to a 
medical malpractice claim, which commits to undertaking structural reform 
to correct the problem, from one that fails to reform the root cause of the in-
jury.  Regardless of one’s disciplinary perspective, it seems uncontroversial 
that one of the most meaningful aspects of just about any apology is its rela-
tionship to the offender’s future behavior.  Admittedly, measuring these as-
pects of apologetic meaning presents some difficulty, as it is surely more 
 
 41. Robbennolt, Attorneys, Apologies, and Settlement Negotiation, supra note 13, at 352 (cit-
ing NICHOLAS TAUVUCHIS, MEA CUOA: A SOCIOLOGY OF APOLOGY AND RECONCILIATION 3 
(1991)). 
 42. Robbennolt, Apologies and Settlement Levers, supra note 11, at 357 n.104. 
 43. Robbennolt, Apologies and Plea Bargaining, supra note 7, at 302 (noting that “some 
scholars and practitioners reason that defendants who are remorseful are less likely to repeat their 
crimes and therefore need little deterrence,” but we currently have little evidence for such an im-
portant claim). 
25
Smith: Just Apologies: An Overview of the Philosophical Issues
Published by Pepperdine Digital Commons, 2013
 60 
feasible for researchers to limit definitions of apologies to the words spoken 
than to study the full range of an offender’s future behavior and moral trans-
formation over her lifetime. 
Empirical studies of apologies can lend important insights, and they will 
provide further illumination as they continue to grow more sophisticated.  
We should be careful, however, not to let facility in empirical research re-
strict our understandings of these concepts.  Inversely, of course, philosophi-
cal theories of apologies disregarding empirical findings suffer from a dif-
ferent set of weaknesses.  Although the author aims for an appropriately 
dialectical balance between the disciplines, this is easier said than done.  
One hopes that representatives from the various perspectives working in this 
area can keep each other honest, and integrate the most sensible contribu-
tions regardless of their methodological origins. 
 
III. THE PENITENT AND THE PENITENTIARY: CRIME, PUNISHMENT, AND 
APOLOGIES 
A.  Court-ordered Apologies 
Although it may seem like a progressive alternative to incarceration 
when we find it in modern penal institutions, the practice of ordering con-
victs to apologize for their deeds has a dark history.  Numerous religious 
traditions routinely tortured subjects until they confessed and repented, and 
authoritarian states have long coerced public statements of “rehabilitation” 
from dissidents.  In this respect, Linda Radzik makes an important and un-
derappreciated claim in Making Amends.  “The history of atonement,” she 
writes, “is in large part a history of degradation.”44  In retrospect, traditions 
of repentance often seem like thinly veiled justifications to compound the 
suffering of the disadvantaged.  Whether women were ritually shamed for 
being sexually assaulted by men or colonial subjects were tortured in the 
name of Christian repentance, Radzik warns that “society’s most vulnerable 
groups are likely to suffer disproportionately under atonement systems.”45  
The powerful can also manipulate conceptions of atonement to their ad-
vantage.  An example is when institutions like churches hypocritically call 
for retribution against sinners, but call for forgiveness when finding their 
own members embroiled in a scandal like the case of the Magdalen asylums 
of Ireland.46  Radzik also worries that elevating suffering to a criterion for 
redemption can encourage submissiveness within vulnerable populations, 
 
 44. RADZIK, MAKING AMENDS, supra note 12, at 18. 
 45. Id. at 17. 
 46. See id. at 193. 
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leading them to accept various harms as legitimate aspects of atonement 
when they should be questioning and fighting these injustices.  When we add 
everyday Schadenfreude to the list, one has good reason to be appropriately 
wary when theorizing about atonement.47  Thus, when a contemporary judge 
requires a convict to publish a letter in the newspaper apologizing for a sex-
ual assault or driving while intoxicated, its meanings are unclear.  Should 
such a requirement be understood as an innovative form of restorative jus-
tice, an additional deterrent for future offenders, a retributive or even venge-
ful attempt to humiliate convicts, or some confused hodgepodge of punish-
ment theory?  The intentions are rarely made explicit. 
If an offender recognizes her transgressions as a moral failure, a re-
quirement of the categorical apology as I argued in I Was Wrong, then some-
thing like a sense of duty will motivate her apology.  Surely such voluntary 
apologies hold very different sorts of meanings from expressions of contri-
tion ordered by courts.  Even without apologies from offenders, the legal 
process can establish a factual record, assign blame, excuse accidents, identi-
fy and affirm the values breached, recognize the victims as members of the 
moral community, levy penalties, and oversee the completion of sentences 
and redress.  What, then, does a court-ordered apology add? 
Like so many issues, we can trace much of our thinking about court-
ordered apologies to Kant.  Kantian ethical theory pulls in two directions.  
On the one hand, one finds in Kant arguably the most inspiring secular artic-
ulation of the meaning and significance of humanity.  From the Kantian 
framework, the human agent deserves respect above all else.  Anything that 
prevents us from orienting our lives by our duties to care for each other 
should be understood as a lie that must be exposed in the radiance of en-
lightenment rationality.  Despite the arguably racist, sexist, or speciesist un-
dercurrents in his corpus, the central Kantian message rings true for many: 
clear thinking teaches us that humans deserve respect and people or institu-
tions violating this principle must be reformed.  This informs much of the 
spirit of the restorative justice movement and its efforts to humanize modern 
legal practices.  When first learning Kant, one might expect a kinder, gentler 
theory of punishment.  Kant’s retributive theory of punishment, however, 
feels very different in spirit from his general ethical theory.  From his en-
dorsement of capital punishment to his approval of humiliation as a retribu-
tive sanction, Kant hardly seems progressive to many advocates of restora-
tive justice.  Kant’s theory of punishment looks to be on the wrong side of 
 
 47. See id. at 15. 
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enlightened history.  R.A. Duff attempted to massage this tension nearly 
twenty-five years ago by describing his theory as “Kantian” while refusing 
to “call it Kant’s principle,” and two recent books—Radzik’s Making 
Amends and Christopher Bennett’s Apology Ritual—use different strategies 
in their efforts to reconcile Kant and restorative justice.48  The issue becomes 
especially prominent regarding involuntary apologies in law.49 
Kant provides the following scenario in his 1797 The Metaphysical 
Elements of Justice: Now, it might seem that the existence of class 
distinctions would not allow for the [application of the] retributive 
principle of returning like for like.  Nevertheless, even though these 
class distinctions may not make it possible to apply this principle to 
the letter, it can still always remain applicable in its effects if regard 
is had to the special sensibilities of the higher classes.  Thus, for ex-
ample, the imposition of a fine for a verbal injury has no propor-
tionality to the original injury, for someone who has a good deal of 
money can easily afford to make insults whenever he wishes.  On 
the other hand, the humiliation of the pride of such an offender 
comes much closer to equaling an injury done to the honor of the 
person offended; thus the judgment and Law might require the of-
fender, not only to make a public apology to the offended person, 
but also at the same time to kiss his hand, even though he be social-
ly inferior.  Similarly, if a man of a higher class has violently at-
tacked an innocent citizen who is socially inferior to him, he may be 
condemned, not only to apologize, but to undergo solitary and pain-
ful confinement, because by this means, in addition to the discom-
fort suffered, the pride of the offender will be painfully affected, 
and thus his humiliation will compensate for the offense as like for 
like.50 
This passage appears to make evident not only the retributive tenor of 
Kant’s call for apologies in law, but more specifically the inherent value of 
humiliation as a counterweight on the scales of justice.  Kant justifies court-
ordered apologies, in other words, because offenders—at least the sorts of 
offenders in this case—deserve to suffer the negative emotions associated 
with such rituals.  I find Kant’s position here peculiar, even by Kantian log-
ic. 
 
 48. RADZIK, MAKING AMENDS, supra note 12.  (Although she admits to subscribing to a 
“broadly Kantian approach to moral theory,” Radzik distances herself from retributivism); see also 
BENNETT, THE APOLOGY RITUAL, supra note 12, at 7 (describing his view as a punitive theory of 
restorative justice, Bennett writes: “unlike many proponents of restorative justice, I believe that the 
right theory of the importance of apology will lead us to understand properly the importance of puni-
tive responses to wrongdoing.  On my view, understanding apology will give us an answer to the 
question of why hard treatment is a necessary part of a response to wrongdoing.  Thus I will depart 
from those who think of restorative justice as being a non-punitive response to crime.”). 
 49. R.A. DUFF, TRIALS AND PUNISHMENTS 6 (1986). 
 50. KANT, supra note 12 
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For one, Kant—the great advocate of truth telling—implies that the state 
can punish an unrepentant offender by requiring her to lie about her beliefs, 
values, or feelings in a court-ordered apology.  The source of the humilia-
tion, therefore, may be twofold: not only must you admit your wrongdoing 
publicly, but you are required to participate in your degradation by publicly 
lying and denouncing your private views to comply with court orders.  In 
addition, the emphasis on emotions seems out of place in a Kantian frame-
work given that Kant would be expected to minimize the role of emotions in 
apologetic meaning.  Surely within a Kantian framework one’s motivation 
for apologizing should not be to reduce her negative emotions or minimize 
her sentence.  Notice also how the emotional component of apologetic 
meaning adds to the difficulties facing binary theories of apologies: which 
emotions, with what intensity, and for what duration must they be experi-
enced?  Just how much humiliation must the apologizer experience for her 
punishment to be proportional to her offense?  And how can one account for 
divergent cultural attitudes toward displays of emotions? 
It is important to draw attention to this passage in Kant, in part because 
it appears so directly at odds with the Kantian versions of restorative justice 
advanced by leading scholars like Radzik and Bennett.  Without citing the 
humiliation passage above, for instance, Radzik claims that the “suggestion 
that suffering is an intrinsic good that may be offered by way of compensa-
tion is too bloody minded to be acceptable”51 and that the “wrongdoer’s suf-
fering should not be seen as an intrinsic good.”52  Instead, she believes that 
the negative emotions associated with retributivism should be viewed not as 
a form of suffering inherent to just punishment, but rather as the side effects 
of the appropriate disposition to one’s wrongdoing.  She describes experi-
encing guilt after wrongdoing, therefore, as a kind of “moral hangover.”53  
The author shares her sensibilities and, for that reason, resists strictly Kanti-
an justifications for punishment.  Radzik prefers to understand negative 
emotions as not “valuable for their painful nature per se but as indicators that 
the wrongdoer has the proper attitudes about morality and his relation to 
it.”54  Hence Radzik understands her “moral hangover” as a “defense of suf-
fering [that] is not retributivist.”55  Although Bennett understands himself as 
 
 51. See RADZIK, MAKING AMENDS, supra note 12, at 30. 
 52. Id. at 101. 
 53. Id. at 36. 
 54. Id. at 35. 
 55. Id. at 36. 
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a retributivist, he similarly does not see the negative emotions associated 
with court-ordered apologies as the source of their value.  Instead, on Ben-
nett’s account an “apology restores relationships and redeems wrongdoers 
because it expresses emotions that are appropriate to wrongdoing.”56  Both 
of these views seem more defensible than Kant’s own position, but it should 
be noted how they resist Kant’s full-throated retributivism. 
The retributive justification for court-ordered apologies corresponds to 
the “right to punishment” theory inspired by Kantian and Hegelian princi-
ples asserting that legal sanctions must respect an offender’s autonomy and 
her right to be punished like a subject rather than an object of social con-
trol.57  In this tradition Bennett argues for what he calls the “Apology Ritu-
al.”58 
These court-ordered apologies would be “artificial and symbolic”59 but 
would fulfill the “need for the expression of symbolically adequate cen-
sure.”60  Bennett explains: 
by requiring offenders to undertake the sort of reparative action that 
they would be motivated to undertake were they genuinely sorry for 
what they have done, the state condemns crimes in a way that is 
symbolically adequate and hence more meaningful than simple im-
prisonment or fining.61 
Because governments have “no business giving out sentences the explic-
it aim of which is to make offenders genuinely penitent,”62 Bennett believes 
that whether the offender is “genuinely remorseful or not is not relevant to 
his relations with the state.”63  Bennett emphasizes that his court-ordered 
Apology Ritual “does not require offenders to undertake these amends in a 
spirit of remorse or even to put on signs of such remorse”64  For Bennett, 
forcing an offender to go through the motions of an apology is punishment 
enough. 
I will have much to discuss in Just Apologies regarding Bennett’s 
thoughtful but controversial position.  Yet in addition to the aforementioned 
concerns related to Kant’s version of court-ordered apologies, we can flag a 
few questions for further study.  Most basically, as argued in I Was Wrong 
and as noted above, categorical apologies convey various forms of emotional 
meaning for victims and offenders.  Appreciating the obvious shortcomings 
 
 56. BENNETT, THE APOLOGY RITUAL, supra note 12, at 112. 
 57. See Herbert Morris, Persons and Punishment, 52 THE MONIST 475 (1968). 
 58. BENNETT, THE APOLOGY RITUAL, supra note 12, at 196–97. 
 59. Id. at 149. 
 60. Id. at 196. 
 61. Id. at 9. 
 62. Id. at 154–55. 
 63. Id. at 173. 
 64. Id. at 148. 
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of emotionless apologies for serious offenses, we can ask if our intuition that 
the apologizer deserves to suffer some emotional pain is retributive in na-
ture.65  Do those who wrong others deserve to suffer negative emotions, and 
are court-ordered apologies a legitimate and inexpensive means to “magnify 
the humiliation inherent in conviction,”66 as some argue?67  Rather than rein-
tegrating offenders into the moral community, do such “demeaning rituals” 
alienate convicts by dehumanizing them instead of recognizing their digni-
ty?68  If we expect an apology to include an acceptance of blameworthiness, 
as I do but Bennett does not, how can a court require an offender to internal-
ize moral responsibility?  When a convict continues to assert her innocence 
or refuses to accept blame for the harm, ordering her to apologize seems like 
a display of the state’s authority rather than a stage in the convict’s moral 
transformation.  Courts may lead us to the troughs of virtue in this respect, 
but they cannot make us drink from them.  Likewise, if an offender disagrees 
with the statute under which a court convicts her—for instance, if the state 
finds an advocate for marijuana legalization guilty of possession—should a 
judge increase her punishment unless she apologizes?  We can ask the same 
of any principled refuser who finds her prosecution an example of a state’s 
illegitimacy.  Requiring such a person to contradict her beliefs under the 
threat of punishment recalls the most primitive examples of forced conver-
sions.  This also raises concerns regarding freedom of speech and conscience 
discussed later.  Yet one can also appreciate the value of a court’s demand 
for an apology as an expression of appropriate condemnation: you have 
wronged and we command you—whether you want to or not—to bow your 
head in respect for our laws and your victims. 
 
 65. See SMITH, supra note 1, at 96–107.  For additional examples of philosophical discussions 
of emotions relevant to apologies, see generally JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).  See 
also GUILT AND SHAME (Herbert Morris ed., 1971); SELF-CONSCIOUS EMOTIONS: THE PSYCHOLOGY 
OF SHAME, GUILT, EMBARRASSMENT, AND PRIDE (J. P. Tangney & K. Fischer eds., 1995); GABRIEL 
TAYLOR, PRIDE, SHAME, AND GUILT: EMOTIONS OF SELF-ASSESSMENT (1985); R. J. WALLACE, 
RESPONSIBILITY AND THE MORAL SENTIMENTS (1998); BERNARD WILLIAMS, SHAME AND 
NECESSITY (1994); Cheshire Calhoun, An Apology for Moral Shame, 12 J. POL. PHIL. 127 (2004); 
John Deigh, Shame and Self-Esteem: A Critique, 93 ETHICS 225 (1983). 
 66. Dan Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 6 U. CHI. L. REV. 591, 631–32 (1996) 
(Kahan has since revised views in this paper.  See Dan Kahan, What’s Really Wrong with Shaming 
Sanctions, 84 TEX. L. REV. 2075 (2006)). 
 67. For additional discussions of “shaming sanctions,” see ANDREW VON HIRSCH, CENSURE 
AND SANCTIONS 82–83 (1996); Stephen Garvey, Can Shaming Punishments Educate?, 65 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 733 (1998); James Q. Whitman, What Is Wrong with Inflicting Shame Sanctions?, 107 YALE 
L.J. 1055 (1998). 
 68. See VON HIRSCH, supra note 7, at 82–83. 
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Perhaps more importantly, we should notice that a Kantian disposition 
like that advocated by Radzik and Bennett prevents one from seriously con-
sidering the consequentialist value of restorative justice and apologies in 
law.69  I, for one, will not be satisfied with a theory of contrition and pun-
ishment that does not address the concrete issues of deterrence, rehabilita-
tion, recidivism, and the like.  In this respect one can wonder if court-
ordered apologies provide value as an additional form of deterrent.  Alt-
hough prison sentences may not successfully deter offenders who view serv-
ing time as a means of enhancing their street credibility, for instance, the 
threat of being subjected to the shaming of a court-ordered apology may 
provide a different kind of disincentive to a certain demographic of offend-
ers.  As some have argued, court-ordered apologies could also create oppor-
tunities for the sort of moral reflection that triggers personal transformation 
and reduces recidivism.  Claims of this sort merit further empirical analysis 
before we can judge their full moral value. 
Having said that, it seems that Bennett’s assertion in the conclusion to 
The Apology Ritual is an important point of clarification and contention for 
punishment theory: 
even if one sees deterrence or preventative punishment as necessary, 
why see it as part of punishment rather than as a quite different type of social 
agency, something more akin to welfare or housing, that aims at the eradica-
tion of serious and avoidable harms?  This insistence on the distinctiveness 
of punishment “proper” might look like a valid but uninteresting point, until 
realizing that it is only by insisting on that distinction that one gets a clear 
picture of the moral costs of some aspects of crime prevention—the way in 
which sometimes actions necessary to prevent crime involves wronging in-
dividuals who are owed better treatment.70 
I agree that we should be precise regarding the distinctive retributive 
and consequentialist aspects of both punishments and apologies.  My holistic 
view of apologies in law, therefore, attempts to account for the range of 
meanings and functions of acts of contrition so that we can conceptualize 
and evaluate their full range of moral and practical significance.  Indeed, un-
like other forms of utilitarian punishment that treat “a man like a dog instead 
of with the freedom and respect due to him as a man,” we have some reason 
to believe that what I describe as categorical apologies can go some way to-
ward satisfying both retributive and consequentialist justifications for pun-
 
 69. See BENNETT, THE APOLOGY RITUAL, supra note 12, at 148 (“the fundamental job of the 
criminal sanction is not to induce repentance or to achieve moral reconciliation between offender 
and community: its job is simply to express proportionate condemnation, and that is done perfectly 
well regardless of how the offender receives that condemnation.”). 
 70. Id. at 196. 
32
Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal, Vol. 13, Iss. 1 [2013], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/drlj/vol13/iss1/3
[Vol. 13: 35, 2013]  
PEPPERDINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION LAW JOURNAL 
67 
ishment.71  In my view, however, we are most likely to realize the benefits of 
apologies in criminal law from the sorts of voluntary gestures of contrition 
to which I now turn. 
B. Voluntary Apologies in Criminal Law 
Leading penological theories once imagined the penitentiary as refuge 
where the offender could be removed from the temptations of criminal life 
and shepherded back to her true conscience when left to study her Bible.  
Setting aside the religious underpinnings of such policies, while appreciating 
that modern secular conceptions of apologies have evolved from a conflu-
ence of traditions of repentance, one can make a compelling argument that a 
categorical apology as described in I Was Wrong achieves all of the mean-
ings and functions of effective punishment.  According to that account, a 
categorically apologetic criminal has undergone, a verifiable moral trans-
formation that reorients her behavior.  How should we punish such a person?  
Our moral compasses and policies may point toward reducing sentences for 
the sincerely apologetic, but these intuitions would benefit from some analy-
sis.  Is leniency toward the contrite a vestige of a religious sentiment that 
one’s soul can be saved or reborn, or can we identify other compelling rea-
sons for punishing the apologetic differently from the unapologetic?  What 
are the benefits of such a practice, and how do they compare with the costs? 
The very idea of voluntary apologies in criminal law has been met with 
some resistance in recent philosophical literature.  Both Radzik and Bennett, 
for instance, object to the state’s overt involvement in the sort of moral de-
velopment characterized by voluntary apologies.  Although Bennett claims 
in passing that “of course the world would be a better place if offenders did 
respond to expressions of condemnation with genuine repentance and re-
form,” he doubts that “aiming to make this happen is the business of the 
state, let alone the justification for the criminal sanction.”72  Arguing that it 
is “not part of the remit of the state to pursue the full-blown moral reconcili-
ation that comes with repentance” and that “the state has no duty forcibly to 
rehabilitate the offender, or even to aim to induce repentance in any way 
other than through the symbolically adequate expression of condemnation,” 
 
 71. GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL, THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 246 (T. Knox trans., 
1942) (1820). 
 72. BENNETT, THE APOLOGY RITUAL, supra note 12, at 197. 
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Bennett prefers the sorts of court-ordered apologies noted previously.73  
Radzik questions the relevance of voluntary apologies on similar grounds, 
adding skepticism regarding the authenticity of such gestures.  “How could 
the state possibly contribute to the distinctively moral project of atonement,” 
Radzik asks, “since atonement requires the wrongdoer’s sincere repentance 
and voluntary efforts?”  Because “sincere and voluntary responses cannot be 
compelled by the state,” she continues, “attempts by the state to use the 
criminal justice system to persuade offenders to make amends threaten to 
undermine any credibility that a sincerely repentant offender might other-
wise have.”74  Radzik correctly notes that offenders have “good reason to 
fake a sincerity they do not feel,” but from this general suspicion it seems 
premature to suggest “the use of the criminal justice system to pursue 
amends might be self-defeating.”75 
These concerns do not apply to offenders who voluntarily offer some-
thing like what I call a promissory categorical apology.  If an offender vol-
untarily confesses her crime early in the proceedings (or even before she is 
suspected or apprehended), accepts blame, and undertakes proportionate re-
medial efforts, surely this should have some relevance to how a criminal jus-
tice system treats her.  Undoubtedly, lenience for apologetic offenders cre-
ates incentives for various sorts of “inauthentic” apologies.  If a jurisdiction 
reduces punishment for convicts who express contrition, it invites a parade 
of purely instrumental apologies into its sentencing procedures and risks re-
warding the best actors rather than the most transformed.  One U.S. federal 
appellate court warned that reducing sentences for the contrite will result in 
“lenience toward those who cry more easily, or who have sufficient criminal 
experience to display sentiment at sentencing.”76  However, this does not 
conclude the matter; rather it requires us to consider difficult questions re-
garding whether we have good reasons for reducing punishment for “genu-
inely” apologetic offenders, how we might differentiate between the sorts of 
apologies that should be rewarded and those that amount to little more than 
gaming the system, and what sort of procedures would promote a morally 
sensible and criminologically sound administration of such principles.  Con-
sider, for example, the case of William Beebe.  As part of a twelve-step ad-
diction recovery program, Beebe wrote a letter apologizing to a woman he 
had sexually assaulted twenty years earlier, thereby admitting his guilt for a 
crime for which he was not even suspected.77  Beebe received a ten year sen-
 
 73. Id. at 196–97. 
 74. RADZIK, MAKING AMENDS, supra note 12, at 154. 
 75. Id. at 160. 
 76. United States v. Vance, 62 F.3d 1152, 1158 (9th Cir. 1995). 
 77. Kristen Gelineau, Man Gets 18 Months for ‘84 Attack, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Mar. 16, 2007. 
34
Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal, Vol. 13, Iss. 1 [2013], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/drlj/vol13/iss1/3
[Vol. 13: 35, 2013]  
PEPPERDINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION LAW JOURNAL 
69 
tence for a crime that was not under investigation before his apology, with 
all but eighteen months suspended on the condition that Beebe performed 
500 hours of community service in the area of sexual assault and substance 
abuse on campuses.  Offenders like Beebe who offer morally rich apologies 
admitting guilt, and thereby act contrary to their legal self-interests, present 
materially distinct moral issues from defendants who go through the motions 
of contrition for the primary purpose of reducing their sentences.  Such 
apologies may admittedly be rare, and Margaret Urban-Walker correctly 
notes that the “very contempt and indifference of those with the power to . . . 
terrorize a population . . . is both a source of the crime and what ensures that 
those responsible are likely to disdain judgments of wrong or shrug off re-
sponsibility.”78  Whatever compels us to misdeeds, in other words, probably 
also drives us away from conscientiously apologizing for those offenses.  It 
seems especially unlikely that someone guilty of a grave criminal offense 
can transform from a wrongdoer to an exemplary penitent.  Rarity, however, 
does not diminish significance. 
Presuming for the moment that we can identify those who are genuinely 
categorically apologetic, we face the threshold question of whether they de-
serve less punishment than convicts who show no remorse.  The U.S. Feder-
al Sentencing Guidelines answer in the affirmative, allowing judges to re-
duce punishments by considerable amounts for defendants who “accept 
responsibility” for their crimes and “express remorse.”79  But why, exactly?  
What do these terms signify, how does case law interpret this language, and 
do the provisions capture the sorts of meaning that they should?80  Is it that 
an apology signifies a kind of successful rehabilitation given the fulfilled 
promise to refrain from reoffending?  How, in this regard, do various aspects 
of apologetic meaning predict recidivism rates?  Is recognizing the victim as 
a moral interlocutor, for example, a better indicator of the offender’s future 
 
 78. MARGARET URBAN WALKER, MORAL REPAIR: RECONSTRUCTING MORAL RELATIONS 
AFTER WRONGDOING 202 (2006). 
 79. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1.1 (2009); see also, 2007 U.S. 
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, available at http://www.ussc.gov/2007guid/3e1_1.html. 
 80. See United States v. Fagan, 162 F.3d 1280, 1284 (10th Cir. 1998) (holding that a sentenc-
ing court may depart downward from the sentencing guidelines if it finds the defendant exhibits ex-
ceptional degree of remorse); United States v. Hammick, 36 F.3d 594, 600 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding 
that a guilty plea does not entitle defendant to sentence reduction for acceptance of responsibility, 
judge is to determine whether defendant has manifested acceptance of responsibility in moral sense); 
United States v. Camargo, 908 F.2d 179 (7th Circuit 1990) (holding the two level reduction for 
recognition and personal responsibility where the sentencing court believed defendant’s apology was 
calculated simulation of remorse). 
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behavior than the emotional content of her apology?  Alternatively, might 
exercising lenience toward the repentant undercut the deterrent value of 
some penalties if offenders believe that they will not suffer the full conse-
quences if they can stage an adequate apology?81  Do voluntary apologies 
serve specific or general deterrence?  Bennett argues for the retributive value 
of court-ordered apologies, but what deontological significance can we at-
tribute to voluntary acts of contrition?  When we consider Beebe’s apology 
for his crime twenty years earlier, how can we reconcile the intuition that he 
deserves moral credit for his act with the sense that he also deserves serious 
punishment.  Does lenience in this respect minimize the wrongness of his 
deed or diminish the justice due to the victim?  Or might voluntary categori-
cal apologies present a regulative ideal for a form of punishment that maxi-
mally honors the Kantian and Hegelian traditions of honoring the dignity of 
both offenders and victims? 
If we conclude that apologetic offenders deserve lenience of some kind, 
numerous morally-laden practical issues arise.  How might we distinguish 
between genuine categorical apologies and staged acts of contrition?  If we 
take apologies to signify genuine reform, what sorts of apologetic meanings 
must the offender demonstrate before deserving leniency?  If sentencing 
guidelines allow judges to consider offenders’ contrition, what sorts of 
meaning should they identify?  What criteria should we use to evaluate an 
offender’s interior life and determine the nature of her beliefs, values, emo-
tions, or intentions, thereby differentiating genuine contrition from purely 
instrumental attempts to manipulate the system?82  What attributes of mod-
ern legal culture might unfairly influence our judgments?  In both civil and 
criminal matters, might an attorney’s aggressive style of advocacy—by most 
accounts the sort of representation one should hope for in this system—
cause her client to appear remorseless?83  How might such concerns change 
the practices of criminal prosecution and defense?  Would the opportunity 
for confession further compound the advantages of the wealthy who could 
afford the best attorneys and “contrition consultants” to coach them in the 
subtleties of apologizing? 
When should we judge apologies from an offender?  Must certain ele-
ments, like an admission of guilt, come during plea allocutions or otherwise 
early in the proceedings?  Otherwise, defense attorneys would coach their 
clients to apologize after convictions but before sentencing, in order to max-
imize the benefit but reduce the risks of accepting blame.84  Considering that 
 
 81. See Bibas & Bierschbach, supra note 7. 
 82. See generally Etienne, supra note 7, at 2162; O’Hear, supra note 7, at 1511. 
 83. See Etienne, supra note 7. 
 84. See id. 
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“approximately ninety-five percent of state criminal convictions are obtained 
through guilty pleas,” the relationship between apologies and pleas generally 
deserves special attention.85  We should treat accordingly apologies that be-
come less cautious and more histrionic between conviction and sentencing.  
If we reserve restorative justice practices for the sentencing phase rather than 
for the prosecution, we can appreciate that apologies at that stage may lose 
much of their significance because it can seem too easy to confess after 
you’ve been found guilty.  In addition, arguably the best apologies are like 
promises to change.  As with promises, we cannot fully judge apologies in 
the moments they are spoken.  We need time to search for the deepest values 
that orient our lives and to begin rebuilding our future with habits that honor 
those principles, and this seems especially important in criminal matters.  It 
would seem that the words “I’m sorry” should be viewed with the same 
scrutiny as if someone said “I love you” on the first date: much more infor-
mation would be needed before a well-informed judgment could be made.  If 
we should not simply judge a convict’s apology by her statement at a sen-
tencing hearing, but should rather continually reevaluate her commitment to 
the gesture over her lifetime, then such a process creates considerable logis-
tical problems for a justice system.  Perhaps we should judge a convicts’ 
apology several years into her sentence so that we can better evaluate the 
sincerity of her commitment to reform?  If we seek assurance that the con-
vict does not treat the apology as mere means to earthly ends, perhaps the 
most appropriate moment for repentance is immediately before her execu-
tion, as Foucault found in eighteenth century practices?86  Research suggest-
ing that people generally desire apologies quickly after the offense—and 
seemingly before the offender could have undergone a moral transfor-
 
 85. Etienne and Robbennolt, supra note 7, at 300 (citing Matthew R. Durose & Patrick A. 
Langan, Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Felony Sentences in State Courts, 2002 1 
(2004), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/fssc02.pdf).  For additional discussions of 
the prominence of plea bargaining and its relation to apologies, see GEORGE FISHER, PLEA 
BARGAINING’S TRIUMPH: A HISTORY OF PLEA BARGAINING IN AMERICA (2003); Bibas & Biersch-
bach, supra note 7; Candace McCoy, Plea Bargaining as Coercion: The Trial Penalty and Plea 
Bargaining Reform, 50 CRIM. L. Q. 67 (2005); Jacqueline E. Ross, The Entrenched Position of Plea 
Bargaining in United States Legal Practice, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 717 (2006); Stephen J. Schulhofer, 
Is Plea Bargaining Inevitable? 97 HARV. L. REV. 1037 (1984). 
 86. MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON (Alan Sheridan 
trans., 1995); see also STUART BANNER, THE DEATH PENALTY 16–23 (2003); LAWRENCE 
FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 26 (1993). 
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mation—complicates issues regarding the optimal timing for apologies in 
criminal contexts.87 
Once we determine the criteria for apologies that merit reductions in 
punishment, who should judge whether an individual offender satisfies our 
expectations: judges, juries, victims, or some sort of specialists in contrition?  
How much deference should we grant those evaluating an offender’s contri-
tion?  What sorts of appellate processes should oversee such determinations? 
Where and how should these apologies occur?  I argue in I Was Wrong 
that meaningful apologies consist of far more than the utterance of a few re-
morseful clichés and require a rather intricate series of interpersonal interac-
tions.  Do modern criminal justice systems have time and resources for such 
elaborate rituals?88  If Markus Dubber is correct in his assessment that within 
modern penal institutions “offenders and victims alike are irrelevant nui-
sances, grains of sand in the great machine of state risk management,” can 
the assembly line of justice build in the intricacies of apologetic meaning?89  
Stephanos Bibas and Richard Bierschbach describe how even the most 
“genuinely remorseful offender who wishes to apologize to his victim and 
make amends usually has no readily available way to do so.”90  Offenders 
“almost never” encounter victims until sentencing, instead interacting pri-
marily with their attorneys who are likely to obviate attempts to apologize.  
Even during sentencing, an offender typically directs her statements to the 
court and must literally turn her back on the judge if she wishes to face her 
victim while apologizing.91  Considering this, what sorts of procedural 
mechanisms would be required to create an opportunity for an offender to 
recognize her victim as a moral interlocutor and convey the various forms of 
meaning expected from a categorical apology? 
The significance of plea bargaining for apologies in criminal law should 
be emphasized.  As noted earlier, pleas are the most determinative phase of 
criminal prosecution and their procedures and tendencies will shape the ma-
jority of expressions of contrition in this context.  Questions regarding the 
role of apologies in jury trials and sentencing hearings may hold the most 
immediate interest for philosophers, but they have considerably less practi-
 
 87. For considerations regarding how the timing of apologies impacts their effectiveness, see 
Frantz and Bennigson, supra note 37; Scarlicki et al., supra note 37; and Tomlinson et al., supra 
note 37, at 179–80. 
 88. See generally Bibas & Bierschbach, supra note 7. 
 89. Markus Dubber, Policing Possession: The War on Crime and the End of Criminal Law, 91 
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 829, 849 (2001). 
 90. Bibas & Bierschbach, supra note 7, at 97. 
 91. Id. at 136; see also Szmania and Mangis, supra note 7, at 356 (“It is important to 
acknowledge that offenders are highly restricted, both procedurally and interpersonally, while at-
tempting to express remorse in the traditional criminal justice system”). 
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cal import for most criminal defendants in the contemporary United States 
than do issues related plea bargaining. 
Within a culture of plea bargaining, prosecutors exercise increasing dis-
cretion in state and federal courts regarding who to charge, what to charge, 
and how to punish.92  As a practical matter, prosecutors serve as the primary 
judge of the meaning and value of acts of contrition within the criminal jus-
tice system.  Criminal prosecutors stand in a different relationship to offens-
es than civil plaintiff’s attorneys because they represent the state rather than 
the individual victim.  Whereas a civil attorney is beholden to the wishes of 
her client because the client pays the bill for her legal services, prosecutors 
are employees of the state and operate with much greater independence from 
the will of the victim.  If an apology moves a civil plaintiff to settle, her at-
torney will serve her client’s wishes accordingly.  A criminal prosecutor, 
however, need not consult the victim regarding her perception of an offend-
er’s contrition.  Victims rarely interact with offenders in the contemporary 
criminal justice system, but even if the offender provides a promissory cate-
gorical apology directly to the victim and this moves the injured party to be-
lieve that the state should drop all charges, the prosecutor can usually disre-
gard the victim’s desires.93 
Prosecutors can not only exercise discretion to ignore or discount apolo-
gies, but various reasons suggest that they are likely to do so.  Unlike indi-
vidual victims with emotional investments in the particularities of their inju-
ries, prosecutors stand at a greater critical distance from the offense.  This 
“detachment” renders prosecutors less concerned with the reconciliation—
emotional reconciliation or otherwise—of the specific parties and more fo-
cused on the state’s interests.94  Having accumulated experience with these 
matters, prosecutors can also develop a healthy skepticism for “handcuff 
apologies” that inexperienced victims may lack.  Rather than reducing penal-
ties for contrite offenders, prosecutors may view apologies offered in early 
proceedings as evidence that they have a particularly strong case worthy of a 
full trial or at least a defendant likely to accept a harsh plea offer.95  Inverse-
 
 92. See Etienne & Robbennolt, supra note 7, at 300 (“Over the last several decades, prosecuto-
rial power has been on the rise in state and federal courts”). 
 93. Id. at 307–08 (“The degree to which a crime victim has control over the prosecutor varies 
from limited to non-existent”). 
 94. Id. at 316–17. 
 95. Id. at 320 (“A defendant who desperately wants to plead is more likely to accept the plea 
offer presented.  Following an admission of guilt, her attorney will have little leverage to obtain a 
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ly, defense attorneys—especially overburdened public defenders—might 
consider apologetic clients bad investments of their efforts.  As Robbennolt 
worries, a “defense attorney who is engaging in triage is likely to spend few-
er resources investigating and researching a case with a statement by the de-
fendant expressing responsibility or remorse.”96  An apologetic defendant 
may find herself doubly disadvantaged: prosecutors will pursue her more 
aggressively because they smell blood in the water, while defense attorneys 
devote their attention to more winnable cases.  For several of these reasons, 
Robbennolt has concluded that “contrary to the assertion that apologies 
might lead to more favorable plea bargained outcomes for defendants, the 
nature of plea negotiation renders this result unlikely.”97  Here important 
normative questions arise: should apologies play a more significant role ear-
ly in criminal proceedings, and if so how should we transform those institu-
tions to accommodate and encourage desired social meanings without disad-
vantaging appropriately contrite offenders? 
Additional issues, from the general to the specific, deserve attention. 
Most generally, if an offender does provide a promissory categorical apolo-
gy, should she accept full punishment rather than seek to reduce her sen-
tence?  Does accepting responsibility for criminal offenses, in other words, 
entail accepting the full legal penalties?  How should we treat demonstrably 
insincere apologies designed to manipulate the criminal justice system?  If 
we deem such acts lies designed to deceive, should they be treated as a form 
of perjury and thus as a separate punishable offense?  As with civil law, the 
venue for an apology in a criminal context will inflect much of its meaning.  
Whether in an open court, a local newspaper, or a private post-conviction 
restorative justice proceeding, the context has considerable bearing on the 
meaning and utility of apologetic gestures.98  How do such venues track de-
sired meaning and social functions?  Further questions arise regarding the 
relationship between such lenience and forgiveness.  I Was Wrong argued 
for a dialectical relationship between apologies and forgiveness, and several 
very recent books and volumes have taken up this topic.  Does a categorical 
 
more favorable plea offer.  The primary leverage that defendants have is the threat of trial, and this 
threat may become far less credible after an apology”). 
 96. See id. (“A defense attorney who is engaging in triage is likely to spend fewer resources 
investigating and researching a case with a statement by the defendant expressing responsibility or 
remorse.  Thus, even absent the impact of an apology on the prosecution of the case, an apology may 
affect the defense of the case, likely resulting in a less favorable plea agreement for the defendant”). 
 97. Id. at 301. 
 98. See Szmania & Mangis, supra note 7 (discussing the relevance of the venue for an apolo-
gy). 
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apology from the offender require the victim to forgive her?99  What is the 
nature of such forgiveness? What is the relationship between forgiveness 
and punishment, mercy, and clemency?  Can one be forgiven upon providing 
a categorical apology yet still deserve punishment?  The author aims for an 
appropriately dialectical balance between the disciplines, for instance with 
philosophers refining the concepts and social scientists providing data that 
both corroborates the concepts and calls for their further development. 
C. Apologies and Restorative Justice 
It is also useful to consider the developing literature on apologies and 
restorative justice.  Considering its emphasis on various aspects of the rela-
tionship between offenders, victims, and communities, many attributes of 
 
 99. See SMITH, supra note 1, at 132–39 (discussing the relationship between apologies and 
forgiveness); for examples of discussions of forgiveness in the history of philosophy, see HANNAH 
ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION (1968); JOSEPH BUTLER, FIFTEEN SERMONS PREACHED AT THE 
ROLLS CHAPEL (Robert Carmichael ed., 1856); JACQUES DERRIDA, COSMOPOLITANISM AND 
FORGIVENESS (M. Dooley & R. Kearney trans., 2001); Jacques Derrida, On Forgiving, in 
QUESTIONING GOD (John Caputo et al. eds., 2001); GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL, 
PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT §670 (A. V. Miller trans., 1977); Seneca, De Ira, in SENECA: MORAL 
AND POLITICAL ESSAYS (John M. Cooper & J. F. Procopé eds., 1995). 
For examples of philosophers discussing forgiveness in recent literature, see BEFORE FORGIVING: 
CAUTIONARY TALES OF FORGIVENESS IN PSYCHOTHERAPY (Sharon Lamb & Jeffrie Murphy eds., 
2004); PETER DIGESER, POLITICAL FORGIVENESS (2001); TRUDY GOVIER, FORGIVENESS AND 
REVENGE (2002); CHARLES GRISWOLD, FORGIVENESS: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLORATION (2007); 
JORAM HABER, FORGIVENESS: A PHILOSOPHICAL STUDY (1991); MINOW, supra note 36; JEFFRIE 
MURPHY & JEAN HAMPTON, FORGIVENESS AND MERCY (1988); Uma Narayan, Forgiveness, Moral 
Reassessment and Reconciliation, in EXPLORATIONS OF VALUE, (Thomas Magnell ed., Rodopi 
1997); MARGARET URBAN WALKER, MORAL REPAIR: RECONSTRUCTING MORAL RELATIONS AFTER 
WRONGDOING (2006); Jay M. Bernstein, Conscience and Transgression: The Persistence of Misrec-
ognition, 29 BULL.OF THE HEGEL SOC’Y OF GR. BRIT. 55 (1994); Patrick Boleyn-Fitzgerald, What 
Should “Forgiveness” Mean?, 36 J. VALUE INQUIRY 486 (2002); Cheshire Calhoun, Changing 
One’s Heart, 103 ETHICS 76 (1992); Claudia Card, Mercy, 81 PHIL. REV. 182 (1972); Robin Dillon, 
Self-Forgiveness and Self-Respect, 112 ETHICS 53 (2001); Eve Garrard & David McNaughton, In 
Defense of Unconditional Forgiveness, 103 PROCEEDINGS OF THE ARISTOTELIAN SOC’Y 39 (2003); 
Martin Golding, Forgiveness and Regret, 16 PHIL. F. 121 (1984–85); Jean Harvey, Forgiveness as 
an Obligation of the Moral Life, 8 INT’L J. MORAL & SOC. SCI. 211(1993); Margaret 
Holmgren, Forgiveness and the Intrinsic Value of Persons, 30 AM. PHIL. Q. 341 (1993); Martin 
Hughes, Forgiveness, 35 ANALYSIS 113 (March 1975); Aurel Kolnai, Forgiveness, 74 PROC. 
ARISTOTELIAN SOC. 91 (1973–74); Mary Beth Mader, Fore-given Forgiveness, 42 S. J. PHIL. 16 
(2004); David Novitz, Forgiveness and Self-Respect, 58 PHIL. AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RES. 299 
(1998); Martha Nussbaum, Equity and Mercy, 22 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 83 (1993); Pettigrove, supra 
note 33; Norvin Richards, Forgiveness, 99 ETHICS 77 (1988); Robert C. Roberts, Forgivingness, 32 
AM. PHIL. Q. 293 (1995);Wilson, supra note 33; Joanna North, Wrongdoing and Forgiveness, 62 
PHIL. 499 (1987); 
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the restorative justice movement seem to make it a better fit for voluntary 
apologies than punitive adversarial systems.  In particular, restorative justice 
aims to give voice to victims, place them in dialogue with their offenders 
and communities, and maximize the support available to all parties.  Unlike 
routinized criminal justice bureaucracies, proponents of restorative justice 
believe communities can determine more meaningful and compelling sen-
tences for offenders.  As many commentators have explained, restorative 
justice also marks a shift away from an adversarial approach and toward 
reconciliation as its primary objective.  The collaborative tone of restorative 
justice creates an environment conducive to voluntary apologies fundamen-
tally different from the “admit nothing” attitude of adversarial punitive jus-
tice.  While there may be little time or place for reconciliation in punitive 
criminal justice systems, restorative justice was built precisely for these sorts 
of concerns and could provide procedural mechanisms to create an oppor-
tunity for an offender to recognize her victim as a moral interlocutor and 
convey the various forms of meaning expected from a categorical apology. 
However, several issues should be noted, regarding apologies and re-
storative justice.  Following Radzik, one can classify one set of criticisms as 
the “objections from liberal neutrality.”  Bennett has described the “laissez-
faire conception of restorative justice” as advocating for procedures that 
largely exclude the state from the restorative process and trust the relevant 
parties to determine—usually face-to-face—how to best respond to particu-
lar cases.100  This raises several concerns.  First, one might worry with 
Radzik that restorative justice’s reliance on “deep and wide-ranging com-
munications about the causes and effects of crime suggests that the goal is 
the offender’s internal improvement—a change in her point of view, values, 
or motivations, where those are judged to be lacking according to some mor-
al standard.”101  Here, one might argue, the state coercively enforces certain 
moral positions and thus infringes on its citizens’ freedom of conscience.  
Radzik correctly responds that although “the liberal state is committed to 
freedom of conscience and the pluralism of reasonable conceptions of the 
good . . . liberalism is committed, at its core, to certain moral values—
specifically the freedom and equality of persons.”102  In cases of voluntary 
apologies, this objection seems less relevant because the offender presuma-
bly undergoes the moral transformation with a greater degree of independ-
ence from state intervention. 
The second concern claims that restorative justice imposes a certain 
brand of moral transformation not only on offenders, but also on victims, by 
 
 100.  BENNETT, THE APOLOGY RITUAL, supra note 12, at 121. 
 101. RADZIK, MAKING AMENDS, supra note 12, at 161. 
 102. Id. at 163. 
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requiring them to adopt and practice a generally forgiving attitude toward 
injustice and apply it to particular offenders. For those whose gods advocate 
a more vengeful brand of punishment, the principles of restorative justice 
may seem against their faith.  It is not the state’s business, the argument 
goes, to require citizens to adopt a view of punishment contrary to their 
moral beliefs.  Radzik offers a noncommittal response to this objection: “one 
might rather argue that restorative justice systems better enable victims to 
live in accordance with their own conceptions of the good than do standard, 
punitive criminal justice systems.”103  Radzik’s response seems fair enough, 
but one wonders how to evaluate the relative benefits at stake.  Radzik sug-
gests an empirical claim that a greater percentage of the population would 
endorse the restorative justice model, but is this assumption correct and is it 
the best criterion for evaluation?104 
Restorative justice can also create difficulties with respect to the balance 
between achieving context sensitive sentences that respond to the needs of 
individual cases and the need for equality, fairness, and consistency.  Of-
fenders have considerable incentive to coalesce to the views of their victims 
in order avoid even harsher punishments, and Radzik rightly worries that 
“these parties might agree to the negotiation even if they believe their rights 
are not being properly respected.”105  Radzik further notes that such inequali-
ties in bargaining power can be compounded by “race, gender, class, educa-
tion, physical strength, or linguistic abilities.”106  Here she reminds us of 
Martha Nussbaum’s notion of “adaptive preference formation” in which the 
disadvantaged come to expect less and the privileged expect more.  Thus a 
resident of a wealthy community may arrive at a sentencing conference be-
lieving that she has suffered a grave injustice if the offender picked her 
pocket, but a victim who lives in an impoverished area might see such an of-
fense as a rather typical event.  Such differential views of similar crimes can 
lead to a further inequality, where the disadvantaged expect and demand less 
justice than the privileged and thus crimes against the poor will result in 
lighter sentences than crimes against the rich.107  There are good reasons to 
worry, therefore, that the emphasis in restorative justice on specificity and 
 
 103. Id. at 165. 
 104. The author will discuss at length Radzik’s account at length in his forthcoming book, Just 
Apologies: Remorse, Reform, and Punishment. 
 105. Id. at 166. 
 106. Id. at 171. 
 107. Id. at 171–72; see also Martha C. Nussbaum, Adaptive Preferences and Women’s Options, 
17 ECON. & PHIL. 67 (2001). 
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particularity in sentencing risks undermining the values of equality and con-
sistency.108 
Most thoughtful uses of apologies in criminal law require a considerable 
degree of indeterminate sentencing—for instance, as we wait to see if the 
offender honors her promise to reform.  As with all rehabilitative forms of 
punishment that grant discretion to various officials to determine if the of-
fender has met certain expectations, an increased role for apologies in crimi-
nal law creates legitimate concerns regarding fairness in sentencing.  An-
drew Von Hirsh has expressed a retributivist version of this objection, claim-
claiming that considerations of the penitence of offenders fails to honor the 
“principle of proportionality” whereby crimes of equal seriousness should 
receive equally harsh punishments regardless of the convicts’ subsequent at-
titude toward the deed.109  Rather than minimizing the significance of ques-
tions of dessert, a broadly compelling theory of apologies in criminal law 
will explain why an apologetic offender deserves particularized treatment 
and why her sentence is fair.  In this regard some standardization seems pru-
dent: just as like crimes should be treated the same, like apologies should be 
treated the same. 
Just as we can ask whether judges, juries, victims, or some sort of spe-
cialists in contrition should judge the qualities of an offender’s apology with 
procedures administered by the state, it is similarly unclear who should 
evaluate an offender’s voluntary apology within restorative justice proceed-
ings and what sort deference the state should grant these determinations.  It 
is my view that apologies can be complicated and deceptive.  Restorative 
justice practices might prove even more vulnerable to rewarding good actors 
rather than the truly reformed, because of the relative naiveté of its partici-
pants when compared with the experience of professional administrators of 
the punitive system.  Newcomers to the criminal justice system might also 
unwittingly further compound the advantages of the wealthy who can afford 
the best attorneys and “contrition consultants” to coach them in the subtleties 
of apologizing. 
The third objection from liberal neutrality against restorative justice is 
especially troubling, as Radzik also points out.  If individuals are allowed to 
 
 108. Christopher Bennett also appreciates this difficulty.  See BENNETT, THE APOLOGY 
RITUAL, supra note 12, at 179 (“However, we will not be able to be more specific until we know the 
details of the particular offence and the details of the situation of victim and offender.  This suggests 
that judgments about sentencing will rely heavily on the discretion of sentencers and will only be 
able to be lightly constrained by guidelines that are laid down in advance.  The problem with this, 
however, is that it makes it hard to see how we could achieve consistency across cases.  This is a real 
problem if the point of having consistency across cases is to communicate proportionate condemna-
tion of crime.”). 
 109. See von Hirsch & Ashworth, supra note 12, at 101–03. 
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fashion justice according to their beliefs about punishment, this will in all 
likelihood leave the state to enforce inappropriate religious, objectionable, or 
patently unreasonable agreements arrived at in sentencing agreements.  If the 
parties determine that the offender must attend particular religious services 
to achieve repentance or to undergo various forms of humiliation or abuse as 
penance, state agents will be expected to monitor—and thereby implicitly 
endorse—these practices.  As an example of how these face-to-face confer-
ences might arrive at indefensible conclusions, Radzik imagines a sex of-
fender receiving a mild sentence because those around the table at the sen-
tencing meetings believe that the victim deserves some of blame for the as-
assault because she wore revealing clothing.  Here again, we should be 
mindful of the dangers of replacing excessively standardized justice with 
more particularized but inconsistent legal practices. 
Radzik responds to these concerns with a rather general proposal.  The 
liberal state, she argues, “has a broader constituency and a distinctive agenda 
that gives it an independent stake in the resolution of crime.”  Thus, while 
she “approve[s] of restorative justice’s interest in empowering both victims 
and offenders in the criminal justice system, the liberal state should not 
simply endorse whatever outcome the other parties to the conflict decide up-
on.”110  She elaborates: 
[T]he state has a stake in the resolution of crime that is broader than 
its duty simply to aid particular victims, offenders, and even local 
communities in coming to a negotiated resolution.  It has both a 
right and a duty to express its own views about what counts as an 
acceptable and satisfactory resolution.  The state should not replace 
the victim, but neither should it be a neutral bystander or a mere 
servant.111 
Radzik proposes that “the tensions between restorative justice and liber-
alism can be resolved only by granting a greater role to the state than many 
advocates of restorative justice would find acceptable,” but she does not ex-
plain with much specificity what this might entail.112  She suggests that the 
state might adopt procedural safeguards or veto powers, but she leaves the 
central practical issues unresolved.  What sorts of issues will trigger state in-
tervention, and when do restorative justice practices cross the line that re-
quires state intervention?  How will the state police these standards?  What 
 
 110. RADZIK, MAKING AMENDS, supra note 12, at 173. 
 111. Id. at 172. 
 112. Id. at 174. 
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role might judges, lawyers, mediators, juries, or other state agents play?  
How should the state exercise its authority, and what are the penalties for 
rejecting the state’s attempt to veto or otherwise control the outcomes of re-
storative justice?113  Even the most “laissez faire” conceptions of restorative 
justice typically expect the state to participate in the process in some capaci-
ty, but precisely what “greater role” should it play?  Bennett, for instance, 
argues that the state should “retain the role of setting the level of the sen-
tence” but set the sentence in “fairly abstract terms” that would then be filled 
in and made more determinate via restorative justice practices.114  Thus if the 
state determines a sentence of X amount of public service, the community 
could determine what sorts of activities would fill that time.115  Many rich 
issues lie in these details. 
The arguments for reducing sentences for the contrite seem quite com-
pelling, but I hope to unpack these claims so that they can be subjected to 
the scrutiny of social scientists as well moral philosophers.  It is also ex-
pected that answers to the general question, about whether apologetic of-
fenders deserve less punishment than unapologetic offenders, will need to be 
nuanced in various ways.  For example, should apologies from juvenile of-
fenders be treated differently from those from adults?  Should different 
standards be applied to apologies from children?  What comparisons should 
be drawn between court-ordered apologizes and the common parenting tactic 
of requiring children to apologize under threat of punishment or deprivation, 
as in “Say you’re sorry or I’m taking that toy away”?  Do some uses of 
apologies in the moral education of juvenile or adult offenders infringe on 
their freedom of conscience? 
These questions blur the line that I draw between voluntary and involun-
tary apologies, and I anticipate that the middle category will be well-
populated with examples.  Here, I expect to find cases of acts of contrition 
that appear voluntary in the sense that they are not ordered by the court, but 
that are arguably coerced by various social and legal pressures.  We would 
hardly describe an apology from someone with a gun to her head or the 
threat of a death sentence as voluntary, but the issue becomes less clear if the 
incentive structure is less obvious or drastic.  Some apologies might evolve, 
starting as reluctant court-ordered statements designed as occasions for mor-
al reflection and growing into a robust appreciation for the wrongness of the 
offender’s actions.  Duff, in fact, argues that a primary objective of punish-
ment and condemnation should be to bring the offender to understand that 
she should freely repent and accept her punishment as a deserved aspect of 
 
 113. See id. at 173. 
 114. BENNETT, THE APOLOGY RITUAL, supra note 12, at 180. 
 115. Id. 
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her penance.116  Such a moral transformation could result in a hybrid apolo-
gy that begins as coerced, but ends as a categorical state of contrition.  An 
offender might also have an authentic desire to apologize or generally “be-
come a better person,” but she may be uncertain of how to proceed.  Like an 
addict wanting to come clean, the contrite but confused offender may need 
considerable help from the state before she understands how to provide and 
maintain a categorical apology.  Here again the lines between voluntary and 
involuntary—or between education and punishment—seem too simplistic to 
capture the subtleties of apologies unfolding in fluid contexts.  The relative 
significance of such various states of apologies also requires some analysis.  
Even a voluntary instrumental apology—for instance an obviously disingen-
uous statement offered freely in order to curry favor with authorities—has 
value as an expression of the state’s commitment to the breached principle 
and its ability to bend the will of its subjects to honor such laws.  Acts of 
contrition in criminal law fail and succeed in ways that defy binary concep-
tions of apologies, and these questions provide a sense of the work before a 
comprehensive treatment of the subject. 
IV. APOLOGIES IN CIVIL LAW 
A.  An Example 
Antony Duff finds it “notoriously difficult to give a clear and plausible 
account of the distinction between civil and criminal law” with respect to 
both the definitional issues—what precisely is the distinction?—as well as 
the normative questions regarding which sorts of offenses should fall into 
which category.117  Many of the issues salient to apologies in criminal law 
 
 116. See id. at 189 (discussing Bennett’s understanding of Duff’s theory). 
 117. Antony Duff, Legal Punishment, in STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. (Fall 2008 ed.), avail-
able at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/legal-punishment (“It might be tempting to say that crimes 
are ‘public’ wrongs in the sense that they injure the whole community: they threaten social order, for 
instance, or cause ‘social volatility’; or they involve taking unfair advantage over those who obey the 
law; or they undermine the trust on which social life depends.  But such accounts distract our atten-
tion from the wrongs done to the individual victims that most crimes have, when it is those wrongs 
that should be our central concern: we should condemn the rapist or murderer, we should see the 
wrong he has done as our concern, because of what he has done to his victim.  Another suggestion is 
that ‘public’ wrongs are those which flout the community’s essential or most basic values, in which 
all members of the community should see themselves as sharing: the wrong is done to ‘us’, not 
merely to its individual victim, in the sense that we identify ourselves with the victim as a fellow 
citizen.” (internal citations omitted)). 
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will apply with equal force to civil matters, but certain features of modern 
civil law deserve special attention. Identified here are what I consider the 
most significant—and often the most worrisome—questions regarding the 
role of apologies in civil proceedings. 
An example provides a sense of the kinds of questions that evoke con-
cern. Donna Bailey, a mother of two teenage children, had been studying to 
become physical education teacher when she was paralyzed below the neck 
in a rollover crash while riding in a Ford Explorer equipped with Bridge-
stone/Firestone tires.118  This combination of vehicle and tire resulted in at 
least two hundred fatal rollover crashes, and Bailey sued the companies for 
$100 million.  Three of Ford’s lead attorney’s came to her hospital bed and 
apologized to Bailey.  Ford negotiated to videotape the apology, but only if 
the audio would be turned off.  According to Bailey’s attorney, Ford insisted 
on this condition because “they didn’t want anyone hearing what they 
say.”119  Despite what looks like a transparent attempt to limit the public 
value of the apology, it satisfied Bailey.  “The gist of the whole thing was 
that they were truly sorry for what . . . happened to me,” Bailey explained, 
“[a]nd I felt like it was very sincere.”120 Bailey settled for an undisclosed 
amount that day.  Ford’s spokesperson issued a statement: “We are pleased 
to have resolved this case with Donna Bailey . . . .  We extend our sympa-
thies to her and her family.”121 
Such a situation raises many questions, and without a transcript of the 
interactions, we can only speculate about many of the meanings of Ford’s 
apologies.  We do know that Ford did not publicly accept blame for any of 
the crashes.  Ford blamed Bridgestone.  Bridgestone blamed Ford.  It seems 
unlikely that Ford’s attorneys accepted blame in their apology to Bailey, in-
stead providing an expression of sympathy.  The spokesperson’s public ex-
tension of “sympathies to her and her family” provides an additional reason 
to doubt that the semi-private apology explained how and why Ford had 
done something wrong that they would not repeat.  Bailey’s attorneys ex-
plained that she did “not want her case to stand merely for someone who 
wanted a monetary award” but rather “wanted to advance public safety and 
protect lives,” yet we can appreciate how Ford’s refusal to admit guilt un-
dermines this objective.  In fact, at the time of the apology, Bridgestone had 
refused to recall the model of tires that allegedly caused Bailey’s accident.  
It is difficult to see, therefore, how the offenders had reformed their behav-
 
 118. CBS, Tire Victim: Apology Seemed Sincere, Jan. 9, 2001, 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2000/12/20/national/main258587.shtml. 
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ior.  The settlement did include, however, the public release of internal doc-
uments and promises to undergo further reviews of the tires that might lead 
to additional recalls.  Thus we have a rather conflicted series of events: a 
semi-public apology that refuses to admit wrongdoing and seems unlikely to 
initiate reform, yet is accompanied by a negotiated release of the information 
that could indeed lead to reform and increased public safety. 
Many of the concerns addressed in I Was Wrong regarding collective 
apologies surface here.  In addition to avoiding the acceptance of blame, it 
also seems unlikely that Ford named any specific individuals who had 
wronged her.  Instead, the attorneys deflected misdeeds into the abstract col-
lective of the corporation.  On this account, no one in particular deserves 
blame for paralyzing her and killing hundreds of others.  Court documents 
established that Ford engineers and executives knew about rollover problems 
for some time and even redesigned the vehicle without addressing the prob-
lem.  Bridgestone was also aware of the failings on its tires on these vehi-
cles.  None of these individuals appear to have accepted blame in an apology 
to Bailey or other victims.  Those most directly responsible for Bailey’s inju-
ry could have come before her to categorically apologize and admit their 
wrongdoing, experience appropriate emotions, undergo a moral transfor-
mation, promise not to reoffend, and provide redress.  Instead, it seems that 
Ford paid attorneys to express sympathy in a manner that minimized legal 
exposure while maximizing strategic benefit.  In this case, that meant having 
attorneys say what Bailey wanted to hear in order to settle, while concealing 
the content of the apology from the public by turning off the sound on the 
video.  Thus Ford can say that it “apologized” and gain credit for doing so—
both in the settlement negotiations and in the public opinion—without ad-
mitting wrongdoing or otherwise undertaking legal risk.  Ford and Bridge-
stone’s intent—which I have argued is quite significant for an apology’s 
meaning—was clear: to settle as many cases as quickly as possible because 
“protracted litigation would serve no useful purpose” and risked further 
damaging their reputations.122  Ford settled six cases like Bailey’s in a single 
day.  We can hardly fault Ford for its legal strategy, but such examples 
should lead us to ask if our legal practices and institutions sometimes convey 
undeserved moral credit and strategic advantage to even the wrongs sorts of 
apologies. 
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B. Conciliatory Behavior in an Adversarial Environment 
One need not be an orthodox Marxist to appreciate how economic con-
ditions structure the existence of apologies in civil law.  I have written at 
some length about such issues, identifying from a perspective mindful of 
both analytic and Continental traditions the central normative issues at stake 
in the various debates concerning commodification in law.123  The commodi-
fication debate too often swings between rhetorical flourishes, with “root of 
all evil” claims countering dogmatic faith in free markets.  By classifying the 
different types of arguments against commodification, distinguishing these 
issues to the extent possible, and identifying how the normative criteria typi-
cally deployed may in fact bootleg pro-market bias into the discourse, I at-
tempted to lend some conceptual clarity and meta-conceptual analysis to a 
set of problems that will be with us for some time.  Critiques of commodifi-
cation in law face what I call problems of ideology, intractability, and hy-
perbole, and identifying these issues helps to explain the momentum of the 
law and economics movement.  Providing an evenhanded evaluation of the 
relative costs of commodification against its benefits with respect to each of 
the many issues identified would require multiple volumes of analysis, and 
compelling conclusions would benefit from empirical research that has yet 
to begin.  I do not wish to return to those complex and contentious problems 
in much detail here, other than to note how such features give shape to apol-
ogies in civil law. 
Most generally, and as noted in the introduction, apologies can seem out 
of place within an adversarial legal system charged with adjudicating claims 
within highly competitive markets.  We can avoid the chicken or egg prob-
lem regarding whether competitive markets give rise to adversarial law or 
whether adversarial law drives competitive markets by simply recognizing 
that they have coevolved to fit hand in glove. Within this competitive legal 
environment an apology will look, prima facie, like a concession or a sign of 
weakness.  Conciliatory behavior like apologizing simply seems out of place 
in an adversarial environment.  Something like the categorical apology—
even if only the elements of accepting blame and providing redress—seems 
outside the bounds of the practice.  If one wished to apologize in this rich 
sense in order to informally resolve their dispute, litigation would seem 
largely unnecessary.  Considering this, one would not expect to find many 
apologies within such a competitive environment unless they—rather coun-
ter-intuitively—conferred a strategic advantage.  This tactical use of apolo-
 
 123. Nick Smith, Commodification in Law: Ideologies, Intractabilities, and Hyperboles, 
CONTINENTAL PHIL. REV., Feb. 2009, at 101(discussing the process of converting various legao 
harms into monetary value). 
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gies, I argue, results in part from its ability to appear as something more than 
tactical.  One of the primary sources of an apology’s economic value, in oth-
er words, is its tenuous identity as something not commodifiable. 
C. Crosscurrents: Economic Outcomes and Non-Economic Values 
Consider Donna Bailey’s demand for an apology from Ford and the sig-
nificance this held for her.  Bailey did “not want her case to stand merely for 
someone who wanted a monetary award” and the apology—in addition to 
the information released as a condition of the settlement—satisfied her de-
sire for something more than a financial transaction.  The apology, in some 
respect, spoke to the moral nature of her claim.  We can say that it provided 
inherent value rather than serving a merely instrumental or strategic purpose.  
Bailey’s sentiments here resonate with what are probably common intui-
tions: an apology provides value along a different register than a cash pay-
ment might.  If a cheating lover refuses to apologize, but instead offers to 
pay money to compensate for the harm suffered because of her infidelity, 
one will likely take offense.  At a minimum, one will notice that he is cross-
ing two distinct and often incommensurable realms of value.  Despite living 
in a world where one seems comfortable with an increasingly broad range of 
goods entering the stream of commerce, one still maintains some sense of 
the separation—even if only as a form of nostalgia—between commodities 
and goods that should not be bought and sold.  In part because of their his-
torical associations with traditions of repentance, apologies strike us as one 
of those ceremonies that strike deeper than money.124 
This sense of apologies transcending money goes some way toward 
making sense of the 2009 study conducted by a team at the Nottingham 
School of Economics’s Centre for Decision Research and Experimental 
Economics, claiming that even the most transparently tactical apologies con-
ferred rather astonishing benefits to wrongdoers.  In this controlled experi-
ment, eBay sellers responded to dissatisfied costumers with either a stand-
ardized email apology that did not accept blame or a cash payment.  
According to their findings, 45% of the aggrieved parties withdrew their 
complaints after receiving electronic apology.  Only 23% withdrew their 
complaints upon being offered cash payment to withdraw their grievance.125  
 
 124. See SMITH, I WAS WRONG, supra note 1, at 114–125 (discussing how even within some 
religious traditions, repentance could be bought through indulgences and similar practices). 
 125. See Abeler et al., supra note 14. 
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Attempting to explain why customers would be moved by a “cheap talk” 
email denying responsibility, and obviously sent for the purpose of convinc-
ing them to retract their negative comments, the researchers speculated that 
“apologizing triggers a heuristic to forgive that is hard to overcome rational-
ly.”126  They concluded: “apologies are a powerful and at the same time 
cheap tool to influence customers’ behavior.”127  Without making too much 
of this study, it is worth pausing here to emphasize the dramatic nature of 
this assertion: even when recognizing that an apology is provided in order to 
manipulate us, we may still feel a strong urge to give the apologizer what 
she wants.  This brings to mind situations where someone offers an obvious-
ly poor excuse for their behavior, yet we reflexively respond with conciliato-
ry clichés like “don’t worry about it.”  Whether from a desire to minimize 
social conflict or from a sense that it would be somehow impolite to not to 
release the transgressor from our negative evaluations, psychological studies 
suggest that in some respects our impulse to reconcile is deeper than our 
ability to rationally evaluate whether reconciliation is deserved.128  Other 
studies have found, rather incredibly, that we disapprove of victims who do 
not accept even “unconvincing” apologies.129  Within some contexts, in oth-
er words, apologetic language confers credit and triggers responses that 
would not withstand rational evaluation. 
Civil litigators have begun to internalize this point.  What was once con-
sidered a radical strategy of the Toro Company—the subject of many per-
sonal injury claims given the dangerousness of lawn equipment—has be-
come the favored modus operadi of many industries seeking to reduce legal 
damages.  In the words of the title of one of the most influential movements 
advocating for the use of apologies in medicine: “Sorry Works!”130  Empiri-
cal research continues to verify the effectiveness of apologies for potential 
litigants, including a 2009 study led by a Cornell economist finding that 
 
 126. Id. at 235. 
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“safe apology” legislation for medical malpractice cases could “increase the 
number of settlements by 15% within 3 to 5 years of adopting the laws.”131 
Understanding apologies in the crosscurrents of law helps make sense of 
these trends.  In one direction, these currents flow toward extensive com-
modification in civil law.  Litigants’ desires for non-economic value flow in 
the other direction.  To the extent possible, I would like to set aside for the 
moment the general normative questions regarding the increasing promi-
nence of commodification in civil law.  These include debates regarding the 
presuppositions of liberalism, the background conditions of global inequali-
ty, commodification as a cause of poverty, objectification and offenses 
against dignity, exploitation, consent and coercion, instrumentalizing 
tendencies, reductionism and identity thinking, concrete particularities and 
cognitive errors of economic logic, contested notions of violence and domi-
nation, intertwined matters regarding commensurability, fungibility, homog-
enization, the expressive force of commodification in law, the “gateway” 
theory of commodification in law, the role of legal institutions as locations 
for substantive justice, the state of inherent value and sacredness, the meta-
physical status of money, and the features of market cultures and market 
personalities.  I discuss these problems elsewhere, and they are complex is-
sues that polarize readers and present no simple answers.132  Instead, we can 
note a few features of modern civil law that channel litigants toward eco-
nomic remedies. 
I discussed, in I Was Wrong, the importance of shared values for cate-
gorical apologies and the difficulty of reaching such agreements within and 
between pluralistic cultures.  I also noted the uncontroversial fact that, for 
better or for worse, money serves as the prevailing common denominator of 
value between our diverse worldviews.  This is the case in both culture gen-
erally and law specifically, and the law and economics movement has re-
fined the ability of legal institutions to convert nearly all injuries into finan-
cial metrics.  Although the thought may seem disconcerting, attorneys have 
become accustomed to legal handbooks such as Valuing Children in Litiga-
tion: Family and Individual Loss Assessment.  Here they find tables with ti-
tles such as “Benefits from a Child to Parents from Ages 19–58 Based on a 
Child Born in 1977,” “Lost Earnings Capacity and Contribution,” and “In-
 
 131. See Benjamin Ho & Elaine Liu, Does Sorry Work?: The Impact of Apology Laws and 
Medical Malpractice, Feb. 2010, available at 
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vestment Value of Indirect Costs of Generic and Marginal Children for 
Working and Non-Working Mothers by Level of Mother’s Education.”133  
These studies determine the legal value of dead children, and they are con-
ducted exclusively in the language of U.S. dollars.  As courts routinely re-
duce the particularities of one’s flesh, bone, thoughts, and emotions to a 
monetary value, it seems that everything now has a price in civil law.  Again 
setting aside the significant questions regarding the relative benefits and 
harms of such practices against alternatives, we can appreciate the economic 
tenor of contemporary civil law in the United States. 
These tendencies in law do not develop in isolation.  Culture influences 
law, law influences culture, and Pierre Schlag has rendered any clear separa-
tion between law and culture deeply problematic.134  Law is so “inextricably 
intertwined” with culture, society, politics, and markets that attempts to dis-
entangle the causal chains rarely withstand scrutiny.135  Regardless of 
whether law and economic theories cause us generally to think of injuries in 
financial terms or it merely reflects the economic mindset prevalent outside 
of legal institutions, money pervades both spheres as something of an “ulti-
mate value.”  This results, in part, because traditionally dominant moral 
codes founded on conceptions of religious or secular universality fall out of 
favor in the liberal state.  Though critics often contest its neutrality and its 
very presence in certain spheres, money has become widely recognized as 
the most broadly accepted indicator of value.  Financial sensibilities inflect 
our traditionally non-economic evaluative concepts, for instance as “respon-
sibility” takes on increasingly monetary connotations and moral trespasses 
come to be seen as economic injuries.  If one wishes to admit blame and ac-
cept responsibility, she should be mindful that within this culture she may be 
exposing herself to litigation and economic damages in addition to any mor-
al debt she intends to pay.  Even if a litigant seeks primarily moral rather 
than economic redress, she may seek a cash award because she appreciates 
that her culture measures significance in dollars.  A large award conveys that 
the courts have taken a claim seriously and speaks most directly to the sorts 
of cost-benefits analyses that drive policy.  In civil law in the contemporary 
United States—as in the culture at large—success has become largely syn-
onymous with winning money.  Within this climate, some plaintiffs and their 
attorneys understandably view winning in court like hitting the jackpot and 
they roll their dice accordingly. 
 
 133. THOMAS R. IRELAND & JOHN O. WARD, VALUING CHILDREN IN LITIGATION: FAMILY AND 
INDIVIDUAL LOSS ASSESSMENT 9, 27, 103 (1995). 
 134. Pierre Schlag, The De-Differentiation Problem, CONTINENTAL PHIL. REV., Feb. 2009, 35. 
 135. Id. at 35. 
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A plaintiff primarily seeking an apology rather than an economic award 
may find himself swimming against this tide.  Consider, for instance, the 
role of contingency fee arrangements in which attorneys take on matters un-
der the condition that they will receive a percentage of their clients’ win-
nings rather than a flat fee or an hourly rate.  Within modern incentive struc-
tures, most plaintiffs’ attorneys would prefer not to make a living on the 
prospect of receiving one-third of an apology.136  Contingency fee arrange-
ments enfranchise litigants who otherwise could not afford access to the 
courts, but they also encourage attorneys to steer clients toward economic 
remedies.  If the accumulating research is correct and providing an apology 
of some sort tends to lessen the economic damages that an offender must 
pay, this also threatens to decrease the earnings of attorneys compensated 
with contingency fees.  Such a conflict of interest may seem inconsequential, 
but the stakes can be high.  The is especially evident in the context of a 
class-action litigation like Wal-Mart v. Dukes, where attorneys seek to repre-
sent the sexual discrimination claims of 1.6 million women.137  If the attor-
neys negotiate to maximize payment for their clients and thus themselves, 
this would produce rather different social consequences than if they sought 
something like a collective categorical apology from Wal-Mart executives 
that promised to reform their policies and otherwise promote gender equali-
ty.  Notice also how an apology from Wal-Mart concealed within a confi-
dential settlement agreement would have very different meanings and value 
than a public admission of wrongdoing and promise to redress the injuries.  
Ford’s videotaped apology discussed earlier blurs the distinction between 
public and private, with the media widely giving the corporation credit for 
apologizing to Bailey while Ford conceals the content of the gesture by turn-
ing off the sound.  If a plaintiff insists on an apology as the primary or sole 
form of remedy, she will likely need to pay attorney’s fees out of pocket or 
rely on pro bono advocacy.  Plaintiffs who insist that their injury is “not 
about money” may find that this moral high ground comes at a price, and 
shifting the burden of attorneys’ fees in this manner increases the likelihood 
 
 136. See Jean R. Sternlight, Lawyers’ Representation of Clients in Mediation: Using Economics 
and Psychology to Structure Advocacy in a Nonadversarial Setting, 14 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 
269, 271–72 (1999) (“These disparities between the perceptions and incentives of lawyer and client 
may at times impede settlements that would serve the best interests of the client or principal.  Psy-
chological or economic divergences between lawyers and their clients will also sometimes cause a 
settlement to be reached that is inappropriate in that it does not serve the client’s best interests.”). 
 137. Wal-Mart v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011). 
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that apologies as remedies in civil litigation will become luxuries for the 
privileged. 
Considerable disincentives therefore deter both plaintiffs and their attor-
neys from pursuing apologies as a primary remedy, yet this very rarity of 
acts of contrition in law appears to increase their value.  In what can seem 
like a sea of cold economic self-interest, an apology can appear like a bea-
con of compassion.  For those who seek specifically moral redress for their 
injuries or experience discomfort with the idea of converting their suffering 
into financial damages, an apology may resonate loudly in a different regis-
ter of meaning.  We adjudicate a variety of claims in civil proceedings, and 
something is lost in the translation when the law struggles to reduce such a 
range of injuries to a monetary common denominator.  The transactional 
model of justice provides considerable benefits and suffers from many limi-
tations, and the truth lies somewhere between the dueling hyperboles de-
monizing the commodification of human life and evangelizing blind faith in 
liberal market forces.  Within this context, an apology can offer a distinct 
and significant kind of meaning for those who seek more than money from 
their civil actions.  One attorney describes how he believed “something was 
missing” in the cash awards he won for his clients: 
I made this observation firsthand in the early 1980s when I repre-
sented a young widow in a medical negligence case.  Her husband 
had been seriously injured, and the medical team in charge of his 
care failed to discern the extent of the injuries he had sustained.  He 
died a slow and agonizing death.  She was left with small children, 
few financial resources, and deep feelings of resentment against the 
doctors in charge of her husband’s care.  The case was eventually 
settled, and because there were minor children involved, a hearing 
was held to apportion the settlement proceeds between the widow 
and the children.  As we left the courthouse after the hearing, she 
began to rage.  I thought she was disappointed in the apportionment 
ordered by the court or that she regretted settling rather than trying 
the case.  But she denied that either of these feelings was the source 
of her hostility.  She was angry that none of the doctors had ever 
said he was sorry that his conduct had contributed to her husband’s 
death.  She experienced this omission as another injury, moral harm 
added to professional malpractice.  She said that if the doctors had 
apologized, she would have felt more able “to heal.”138 
For this litigant, an apology admitting fault would have conveyed vast 
meaning, perhaps more than any amount of money. 
Herein lies the irony.  As we find with many goods described as price-
less—consider a master work of art—the very notion that something has 
value beyond price renders it very expensive.  The sense that an apology 
 
 138. Taft, Apology Subverted, supra note 6, at 1136–37. 
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within law conveys exceptional non-economic meaning, in other words, cre-
ates an especially valuable commodity.  Recall Bailey’s settlement agree-
ment with Ford.  Once three corporate defense attorneys—who might each 
bill upwards of $1250 per hour—traveled to Bailey’s bedside to deliver un-
disclosed apologetic language, this was enough to convince the paralyzed 
claimant that the settlement was no longer just “about the money.”139  Ford 
settled her case—like numerous others—on the day of the apology.  Again, 
what appears from a plaintiff’s perspective to transcend money looks like an 
effective cost-cutting strategy to the defense. 
D. Specific Strategies and Practices 
Various strategies and practices have come to shape the rather conflicted 
life of apologies within this environment.  Where apologies would have once 
been viewed as conveying weakness in adversarial civil proceedings, their 
economic value as a bargaining tactic that can “lubricate settlement discus-
sions” is now widely accepted by academics and practitioners.140  In the 
widely cited Alternative Dispute Resolution by Apology: Settlement by Say-
ing “I’m Sorry,” for instance, Marshall Tanick and Teresa Ayling describe 
apologizing as “one of the most effective means of averting or solving legal 
disputes.”  They advise that “[l]awyers, litigants, and prospective litigants all 
should be aware . . . of the utility of contrition” and that “apologies should 
be part of the arsenal of resources brought to bear in addressing and resolv-
ing legal disputes.”141 
Dozens of papers have corroborated or repeated this position.  Accord-
ing to various social scientific studies, even apologies that were rather obvi-
ously constructed for the financial benefit of the apologizer and that admit-
ted no fault generated as much as a 45% likelihood that offended parties 
would withdraw their complaints.142  Examples in medicine further support-
ed the financial value of apologies as legislation encouraged or even re-
quired physicians to apologize for adverse outcomes rather than continuing 
the “admit nothing” culture.143  Some civil attorneys now coach clients to 
 
 139. Leigh Jones, Billing: Law Firm Fees Defy Gravity, NAT’L L. J., Dec. 8, 2008, at S1 (re-
porting that attorney billing rates are on the rise, with the most expensive billing rate reported at 
$1260 an hour). 
 140. Tanick & Ayling, supra note 13. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Abeler et al., supra note 14, at 234; WOODS, supra note 3, at 3. 
 143. See supra note 13 for sources discussing apologies in medicine. 
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navigate the dangers and benefits of apologizing in legal contexts, typically 
advising them to say just enough to maximize the appearance of contrition 
without undermining their claims of innocence.144  Tanick and Ayling, for 
instance, recommend that the apology be “carefully crafted to avoid admis-
sion of wrongdoing.”145  Deborah Levi advised in the New York University 
Law Review that “lawyers protective of their clients’ interests might serve 
those interests by encouraging clients to apologize short of admitting liabil-
ity.”146  Levi suggests that “lawyers might allow their clients to express em-
pathy and regret while avoiding formulations that would make liability un-
deniable, such as ‘I neglected my duty,’ ‘my actions caused your injury,’ or 
‘if only I hadn’t done X, you would never have been injured.’”147  In order to 
give the appearance of offering a “sincere” apology and thereby receive the 
strategic benefits of appearing to be remorseful, a defendant can express 
sympathy without admitting responsibility, corroborating the factual record, 
or even acknowledging the legitimacy of the victim’s injury.  Apologies in 
this context also probably do not identify the nature of the moral harm suf-
fered by the plaintiff and therefore also fail to express a shared commitment 
to honoring those values.  The apologizing party may even continue to 
commit the same harm against the plaintiff or others as she apologizes. 
More nuanced strategists propose offering expressions of sympathy first 
as a test to determine if that alone would be “sufficient to quell a purported 
‘victim.’”148  If claimants expect more than sympathy, one can dole out a lit-
tle apologetic meaning at a time to determine how much is needed.  This al-
lows mediators to reserve admissions of guilt as the trump card if negotia-
tions stall.149  Some further advise that if “a full apology is to be made, a 
mediation session preceded by a confidentiality agreement may often be the 
best place for it since apologies made in that forum are protected by federal 
law.”150  Still others warn that, even if you reserve the apology for a confi-
dential mediation session, “clients should be counseled not to make an ad-
mission of fault, especially since such an admission is not a requirement of 
an authentic apology.”151  Some claim that offenders should leave the act of 
 
 144. See Robin Topping, Attorneys Balance ‘Safe’ with ‘Sorry’, NEWSDAY, Feb. 4, 2004, at 
A22, available at http://www.newsday.com/columnists/robin-topping/attorneys-balance-safe-with-
sorry-1.715090. 
 145. Tanick & Ayling, supra note 13. 
 146. Levi, The Role of Apology in Mediation, supra note 2, at 1188. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Patel & Reinsch, supra note 13, at 22. 
 149. Id. at 23. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Pavlick, supra note 13, at 863.  See also Cohen, Advising Clients to Apologize, supra note 
4, at 1058 (“A more cautious approach would have been to write a note expressing sympathy for the 
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apologizing to their attorneys “in order to prevent unwitting exposure to lia-
bility or inadvertent admitting of guilt.”152 
Many of these strategies go further than claiming that defendants should 
pitch an expression of sympathy in apologetic language in order to receive 
the moral—and thus strategic—benefit of admitting wrongdoing when they 
have not.  Instead, this discourse repeatedly and explicitly asserts that apol-
ogies are not confessions of wrongdoing.  I defend at some length in I Was 
Wrong that traditions of apologies and repentance have a core meaning 
grounded in thousands of years of history across a wide range of cultures: 
the most significant kinds of apologies admit wrongdoing and signify moral 
transformation, and this is why they can convey such profound meaning for 
us.  Yet without any serious explanation of how they arrive at this position, 
those who write on apologies in law gravitate toward the claim that apolo-
gies have only accidental relationships to confessions of guilt.  Robert Cor-
nell, Rick Warne, and Martha Eining assure readers that “an apology is not 
synonymous with an admission of guilt or fault.”153  Donna Pavlick believes 
“clients should be counseled not to make an admission of fault, especially 
since such an admission is not a requirement of an authentic apology.”154  
Still another 2009 study claims that apologizing may lead to favorable ver-
dicts, while explicitly claiming that apologies express sorrow “without ad-
mitting guilt.”155  Others frame the divorce of apologies and accepting blame 
as a matter of courtesy: “Not to say, ‘I’m sorry’ is rude and arrogant.  It has 
nothing to do with fault.”156 
In one sense, the rather incredible assertion that apologies have “nothing 
to do with fault” could result from the logic of the discourse in context: 
apologies only make sense in law and only have a place in law if we under-
stand them as something other than admissions of fault.  Otherwise there is 
no place for them within adversarial legal institutions, like there is no place 
for giving away goals in a soccer match.  The dissonance we experience 
from this perspective is like forcing a square peg into a round hole—when 
we round apologies by removing the aspect of confession we distort them 
 
injury without admitting fault (‘Dear Ms. Reardon, I write to express my wishes that you are feeling 
well following our accident several days ago. Sincerely yours, Mr. Trendle.’) and to wait until later 
to admit fault (but not assume liability), ideally in a ‘safe’ channel such as mediation.”). 
 152. Patel & Reinsch, supra note 14, at 23. 
 153. Cornell et al., supra note 14, at 770 (emphasis in original). 
 154. Pavlick, supra note 13, at 863. 
 155. Cornell et al., supra note 14, at 767. 
 156. Kanazawa, supra note 13, at 32. 
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beyond recognition.  The other possibility seems less benign: legislators and 
defense attorneys repeat the counter-intuitive notion that apologies do not 
admit fault because cultivating this revised usage conveys strategic ad-
vantage.  Powerful interests stand to gain from this linguistic development 
and these interests also exert disproportionate control over language usage—
winners write not only the histories, but also the clause in legislation defin-
ing the terms that govern us.  I do not mean to suggest that legal scholars or 
civil attorneys intentionally conspire to distort language to their advantage, 
but surely the aggregation of power behind one definition can sway accepted 
definitions of legal terminology.  For those with the most power over legal 
discourse, most of the incentives point toward redefining apologies as some-
thing other than moral transformations that admit guilt and promise reform. 
While one might fairly question the significance of a few bare assuranc-
es from attorneys and legal scholars claiming that apologies have do not ad-
mit wrongdoing, legislative records codify this position.  Like civil defense 
attorneys, legislators have an interest in how legal actors understand apolo-
gies because of the political pressure surrounding “tort reform.”  If apologies 
without admissions of fault can reduce litigation and if powerful constituen-
cies favor tort reform, legislators stand to benefit from promulgating a defi-
nition of apology that best serves their interests.  The origins of “safe apolo-
gy” statutes which provide evidentiary “safe havens” for certain types of 
apologies may not seem, prima facie, as politically calculated as I suggest.  
Commentators emphasize the emotional motivations of Massachusetts’s pi-
oneering laws on this matter, which carved out a protected legal space for 
conversations like the one desired by the legislator who sought an apology 
from a driver who killed his daughter.157  As other states followed Massa-
chusetts’s example, the political and economic justifications for describing 
expressions of sympathy as apologies became more apparent.  Tort reform 
comes to serve as the primary justification driving safe apology legisla-
tion.158  Some states protect expressions of sympathy but do not cover state-
 
 157. See supra note 25 for sources discussing safe apology legislation. 
 158. Robbennolt gathered several sources attesting to the claims that safe apology legislation 
would advance the objective of tort reform.  See Robbennolt, Apologies and Legal Settlement, supra 
note 12, at 505 n.214 (citing Cal. Assembly Comm. on Judiciary, Comment to CAL. EVID. CODE 
1160 (“The author introduced this bill in an attempt to reduce lawsuits and encourage settlements by 
fostering the use of apologies in connection with accident-related injuries or death.”)).  See also 
TENN. R. EVID. § 409.1 advisory commission comment (stating that legislation was “designed to 
encourage the settlement of lawsuits”); Arthur Kane, GOP Pushes Tort Reform, DENVER POST, Apr. 
6, 2003, at B4; Al Lewis, Malpractice Measure is “Sorry” Protection, DENVER POST, Apr. 13, 2003, 
at K1 (describing the bill as “among a dozen tort reform proposals”); Peggy Lowe, “Sorry” Bill Ad-
vances, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Apr. 2, 2003, at 22A (noting that opponents described legislation 
as “anti-patient rights”).  Also, the materials at Wojcieszak, supra note 24, claim many benefits of 
apologies for medicine. 
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ments of fault.159  Some statutes only apply to cases of medical error.160  As 
the result of contested tort reform initiatives, Colorado now protects even 
admissions of wrongdoing.161  Some statutes provide general protection for 
apologies while leaving the term ambiguous.162  Within a larger tort reform 
package, members of the Texas legislature unsuccessfully attempted to make 
definitions of safe apologies more ambiguous by repealing provisions clari-
fying that acknowledgements of fault remained admissible.163  Some states 
specifically emphasize the significance of these measures for tort reform in 
health care and make specific demands of health care providers.  Pennsylva-
nia, Nevada, and New Jersey, for instance, require providers to notify pa-
tients of preventable adverse events.164  Thus, many powerful forces seek 
control of the pen when we define apologies, and their interests color their 
understanding of this contested term that references our deepest values and 
oldest moral traditions.  From the perspective of conceptual analysis, it 
seems rather obvious that “I am sorry for your loss” conveys distinct moral 
meaning from “I confess that I killed your daughter.”  When viewed in the 
 
 159. See FLA. STAT. § 90.4026(2) (2010) (“The portion of statements, writings, or benevolent 
gestures expressing sympathy or a general sense of benevolence relating to the pain, suffering, or 
death of a person involved in an accident and made to that person or to the family of that person 
shall be inadmissible as evidence in a civil action. A statement of fault, however, which is part of, or 
in addition to, any of the above shall be admissible pursuant to this section.”).  See also CAL. EVID. 
CODE § 1160(a) (2009) (expressions of sympathy are inadmissible in proving liability, unless they 
are accompanied by a statement of fault); TENN. R. EVID. § 409.1 (2010) (expressions of sympathy, 
except statements of fault, are inadmissible to prove liability); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. 
18.061(a) (1) (West 2010) (expressions of sympathy, except those relating to “culpable conduct,” are 
inadmissible in court); WASH. REV. CODE § 5.66.010(1) (2010) (expressions of sympathy, except 
statements of fault, are inadmissible as evidence). 
 160. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-25-135 (2003) (extends to actions “brought by an alleged 
victim of an unanticipated outcome of medical care”); GA. CODE ANN. § 24-3-37.1 (2006); OHIO 
REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.43 (Lexis Nexis 2010); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-1708.1H (West 
2010); OR. REV. STAT. § 677.082 (2003); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-1-130 (2010). 
 161. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-25-135 (“In any civil action brought by an alleged victim of an 
unanticipated outcome of medical care, or in any arbitration proceeding related to such civil action, 
any and all statements, affirmations, gestures, or conduct expressing apology, fault, sympathy, com-
miseration, condolence, compassion, or a general sense of benevolence . . . which relate[s] to the 
discomfort, pain, suffering, injury, or death of the alleged victim as the result of the unanticipated 
outcome of medical care shall be inadmissible as evidence of an admission of liability.”).  See also 
GA. CODE ANN. § 24-3-37.1 (2006). 
 162. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.43 (Lexis Nexis 2010); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, 
§ 1-1708.1H (West 2010); OR. REV. STAT. § 677.082 (2003); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-1-130 (2010). 
 163. H.R. 4, 78th LEG., REG. SESS. (Tex. 2003) (March 28, 2003 version). 
 164. See Robbennolt, What We Know and Don’t About the Role of Apologies in Resolving 
Health Care Disputes, supra note 12, at 1010–11 (discussing the specific legislation in these states). 
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context of contemporary legal, political, and economic culture, however, 
matters are considerably more complicated. 
I intend to consider additional features of contemporary law that explain 
its confounding and often contradictory relationship to apologies.  Given that 
apologies—even if understood as expressions of sympathy rather than ad-
missions of guilt—become economically valuable in part because they signi-
fy something more than economic value, some argue that they should be ex-
changed or bargained for like other legal goods.  When arguing for Hong 
Kong courts to utilize apologies as a remedy in disability discrimination cas-
es, for instance, Carol Peterson suggests that courts “should ask the defend-
ant whether he is willing to give the apology, making it clear that if he is 
unwilling to do so the court will increase the award of monetary damages by 
a specified amount.”165  If the defendant declines to apologize, the court 
would order damages at the higher level in order “to compensate for the fact 
that the defendant was unwilling to give an apology.”166  Although this par-
ticular example invokes the diverse cultural conceptions of apologies that I 
addressed in I Was Wrong, such reduction of an apology to a cash value 
makes explicit many of the tensions, and peculiarities, and concerns raised 
throughout this work. 
Also notice that if the law construes an apology as something other than 
an admission of guilt, the apologizing party need not admit to having done 
anything wrong.  If they have not transgressed, they need not reform their 
behavior.  Thus a party can simultaneously offer a “safe apology” while con-
tinuing to commit the same offense against the plaintiff or others. In a prod-
uct liability action—consider the Ford rollover example—Ford could offer a 
safe apology without taking any actions to fix the problem.  Indeed, Ford 
could offer a safe apology while simultaneously launching a public relations 
campaign denying wrongdoing and assuring the public regarding the safety 
of vehicles they know to be faulty.  Cost-benefit analyses may often find 
providing a safe apology and settling a claim in this manner a cost-effective 
alternative to recalling and expending resources to improve a dangerous 
product. 
The Ford example raises further questions regarding the role of apolo-
gies in settlements.167  Considering that the majority of civil cases in the 
United States end in settlement agreements, these issues have considerable 
practical significance.  The substance of many of these agreements is pro-
 
 165. Carole J. Peterson, The Failure of the Hong Kong Court of Appeal to Recognise and Rem-
edy Disability Discrimination, 30 HONG KONG L. J. 6, 20 (2000). 
 166. Id. 
 167. Shuman, supra note 12, at 186–87 (discussing how negotiated apologies in settlements 
serve a different purpose than spontaneous apologies). 
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tected by strict confidentiality provisions which allow parties to resolve con-
flicts outside the realm of public scrutiny.  Apologies offered in such con-
texts often have distinct meanings from public apologies.  In the Ford exam-
ple, a public declaration admitting wrongdoing and committing to reform 
would have been an occasion for public discussion where Ford would be on 
the record describing what it did, why it was wrong, and how it would cor-
rect the problem.  The public could then evaluate Ford’s future behavior in 
light of these declarations.  Instead, the primary value of Ford’s apology is 
limited to its perceived value by an individual victim. 
We can also worry that Ford shields the apology from public scrutiny 
because it would not withstand analysis.  This can compound the often con-
siderable imbalance of power between parties.  Many claims between so-
phisticated corporate defendants and individual plaintiffs take place through 
arbitration or settlement proceedings.  Removing disputes from public pro-
ceedings can exacerbate power differentials between disputants as legally 
savvy wrongdoers can convince inexperienced and vulnerable victims of the 
value and sincerity of their apology.  In light of the economic incentives in 
class action litigation, for example, civil defense attorneys have strategic 
reasons to offer confidential apologies in settlement agreements if doing so 
carries little risk (both within that particular negotiation and with respect to 
exposure to future litigation) and might soften plaintiffs’ demands for finan-
cial damages.  Defense attorneys can “divide and conquer in this respect,” 
reaching favorable terms with individual claimants that would not satisfy a 
unified class of victims who publicly stated their demands and collectively 
scrutinized offers. 
Also notice here peculiarities related to issues of standing.  In I Was 
Wrong, I discussed the significance of an offender’s standing to accept 
blame for the wrongdoing.  A categorical apology requires an offender to 
accept proximate responsibility and thereby blame for the harm.  The of-
fender—rather than a proxy or other third party—will undertake the work of 
apologizing.  Notice in this respect the difference between a corporate exec-
utive admitting her personal failures and blameworthiness for the harm and 
statements from a team of attorneys who are paid to express sympathy on 
behalf of a corporate client.  While such statements from paid representative 
may convey important meanings in some respects, much of the richest moral 
content can only be provided by those who committed the wrongdoing.  
Some apologetic meanings, in other words, cannot be delegated just as I 
cannot have someone exercise for me.  In this light we can anticipate the 
sorts of questions that will arise when litigants employ attorneys trained in 
both the law and psychology of contrition.  Given the financial stakes of 
63
Smith: Just Apologies: An Overview of the Philosophical Issues
Published by Pepperdine Digital Commons, 2013
 98 
conveying the proper emotions, leveraging those sentiments into favorable 
outcomes, and avoiding further exposure, paying someone to apologize for 
you might seem like money well spent. 
I consider the role of contrite emotions in the criminal context, and civil 
litigation presents related questions.  Attorneys are taught to advocate for the 
legal advantage of their clients, and they may view the emotional stakes of 
litigation as irrelevant to or even competing with legal strategy.168  If an in-
jured party seeks an apology to satisfy an emotional need—discussed in I 
Was Wrong as notoriously complex desires—how might this influence her 
legal tactics and her perception of the quality of her representation?169  
Might she be more susceptible to being “duped” or otherwise settling for 
less than she deserves?170  Robbennolt’s research in the context of settlement 
negotiations suggests that “participants who received an apology from a 
clear offender had lower reservation prices, aspirations, and conceptions of 
fair settlements,” which rightly “raises the concern that plaintiffs may be 
persuaded by an apology to agree to a settlement that does not provide them 
with the monetary settlement to which they may be legally entitled.”171  Here 
 
 168. See Robbennolt, Attorneys, Apologies, and Settlement Negotiation, supra note 13, at 351 
(exploring “how attorneys respond to apologies offered in litigation as they advise claimants about 
settlement, and compares the reactions of attorneys to those of lay litigants”); Sternlight, supra note 
136, at 321–22 (“Clients’ nonmonetary incentives or goals are not always shared by their attorneys. 
Because the attorney does not share her client’s nonmonetary interests, she may regard these inter-
ests as having little or no value.  She therefore may not present them or certainly not emphasize them 
as part of the settlement package.  Yet, if these nonmonetary interests are important to the client, 
their absence may well prevent a settlement from being reached.  Some examples should help to 
clarify the point.  A client in an employment discrimination case might seek not only monetary com-
pensation but also nonmonetary relief including an apology, establishment of a training program 
intended to discourage future discrimination, or reinstatement.  More generally, the client may seek 
dignity and respect.  Yet, these nonmonetary goals likely have little appeal for the attorney who, af-
ter all, cannot take a one-third contingency of an apology.  Other nonmonetary client goals might 
include desires for revenge, security, love, an opportunity to ‘vent,’ or the possibility of securing 
future business from the opposing party.  Again, because the attorney likely does not share these 
goals, the attorney will not always take adequate steps to secure them in a settlement.”). 
 169. See Melissa L. Nelkin, Negotiation and Psychoanalysis: If I’d Wanted to Learn About 
Feelings, I Wouldn’t Have Gone to Law School, 46 J. LEGAL EDUC. 420, 423 (1996) (“[C]lients in-
evitably suffer when their lawyers insist on divorcing the professional encounter from the emotional 
underpinnings of the dispute involved.  Client dissatisfaction with legal representation often results 
from the lawyer’s inability to see the client’s emotional self as anything but an impediment to sensi-
ble, rational management of the legal problem the client brings.”). 
 170. See Levi, The Role of Apology in Mediation, supra note 2, at 1171 (“[I]f a plaintiff settles 
because she’s emotionally fulfilled by an apology, isn’t she being duped out of her legal entitle-
ment—an entitlement that the apology itself makes concrete?”); O’Hara & Yarn, On Apology and 
Consilience, supra note 12, at 1186 (“[A]pology can be used as a tool for organizations to strategi-
cally take advantage of individual victims’ instincts to forgive in the face of apology.”); O’Hara, 
supra note 7, at 1079 (discussing how in the context of medical malpractice, meritorious claims are 
often dropped when the doctor apologizes). 
 171. Robbennolt, Apologies and Settlement Levers, supra note 11, at 369. 
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we confront further questions regarding the perception of value.  Robbennolt 
finds that attorneys view the value of apologies in litigation more suspicious-
ly than their clients, but we can ask whether assertions that plaintiffs were 
duped by an apology rely on excessively economic conceptions of worth that 
discount the emotional value of the interaction.172  Or can we say that some 
plaintiffs are in fact misled because they did not actually receive the sort of 
apologetic meaning they sought, for instance when inexperienced plaintiffs 
mistake an expression of sympathy for an acceptance of blame and commit-
ment to reform?  Should attorneys and legislatures take efforts to prevent 
this sort of deception, even if doing so reduces the benefits of such apologies 
to tort reform? 
Although I have emphasized and probably overstated the financial con-
siderations that shape apologies in civil law, money plays a less prominent 
role with respect to numerous other issues that deserve attention.  Consider 
court-ordered apologies in civil law.  If a court requires a defendant to a dis-
crimination claim to apologize in the local newspaper, for instance, this will 
present issues parallel to those discussed earlier regarding court-ordered 
apologies in criminal law.  How, precisely, do civil and criminal court-
ordered apologies differ and how are these differences salient for their moral 
significance and social value?  For an orthodox Marxist, the issues discussed 
regarding the role of economics shaping apologies in civil law will apply 
with equal force to criminal law.  Can we cleanly distinguish economic from 
non-economic issues, especially if we pay proper attention to the roles of 
class, differential quality of legal and political representation, relative power, 
the background conditions of global poverty, and ideology formation?  Such 
questions seem increasingly relevant considering the rise of incarceration as 
a for-profit service industry and the prevalence of arguments like Randy 
Barnett’s for commodifying criminal penalties.173 
As noted in the introduction, apologies in civil law exist within an intri-
cate context in which law influences culture and culture influences law.  Le-
gal concepts both reflect and shape a community’s often conflicted 
worldview, and it can be difficult to hear meaningful apologies through the 
noise of this feedback loop. 
 
 172. Id. (“A concern for plaintiffs’ outcomes is based in part on the assumption that a legally 
defined monetary entitlement is the appropriate benchmark.”) 
 173. See Randy E. Barnett, Restitution: A New Paradigm of Criminal Justice, 87 ETHICS 279 
(1977) (discussing Barnett’s belief that punishment should be abandoned in favor of restitution). 
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V. COLLECTIVE APOLOGIES IN LAW: CORPORATE, NATIONAL, AND 
INSTITUTIONAL WRONGDOING 
Nearly half of I Was Wrong is devoted to collective apologies and col-
lective forgiveness, arguing that collective apologies add layers of complexi-
ty to nearly every facet of apologetic meaning.174  They also tend to traffic in 
 
 174. I consider collective apologies at length in SMITH, I WAS WRONG, supra note 1.  For addi-
tional examples of philosophical discussions of collective responsibility, collective punishment, and 
collective apologies, see Hannah Arendt, Collective Responsibility, in RESPONSIBILITY AND 
JUDGMENT 147 (Jerome Kohn ed., 2003); Hannah Arendt, Organized Guilt and Universal Responsi-
bility, in COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY: FIVE DECADES OF DEBATE IN THEORETICAL AND APPLIED 
ETHICS 273 (Larry May & Stacey Hoffman eds., 1991); MICHAEL E. BRATMAN, FACES OF 
INTENTION: SELECTED ESSAYS ON INTENTION AND AGENCY 109–29 (1999); COLLECTIVE 
RESPONSIBILITY, supra; MEIR DAN-COHEN, RIGHTS, PERSONS, AND ORGANIZATIONS (1986); PETER 
A. FRENCH, COLLECTIVE AND CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY (1984); Peter A. French, The Corpora-
tion as a Moral Person, in COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY, supra, at 133; MARGARET GILBERT, 
LIVING TOGETHER: RATIONALITY, SOCIALITY, AND OBLIGATION (1996); MARGARET GILBERT, ON 
SOCIAL FACTS (1992); INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY (Peter A. French ed., 2d ed. 
1998); KARL JASPERS, THE QUESTION OF GERMAN GUILT (E.B. Ashton trans., 2000); ALASDAIR 
MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY (2d ed. 1984); LARRY MAY, THE 
MORALITY OF GROUPS: COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY, GROUP-BASED HARM AND CORPORATE 
RIGHTS (1987); Camille Paglia, Ask Camille: Camille Paglia’s Advice for the Culturally Disgrun-
tled, SALON MAG., http://www.salon.com, Jul. 8, 1997, reprinted in WHEN SORRY ISN’T ENOUGH: 
THE CONTROVERSY OVER APOLOGIES AND REPARATIONS FOR HUMAN INJUSTICE (Roy L. Brooks 
ed., 1999); JOHN R. SEARLE, THE CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL REALITY (1995); CHRISTOPHER D. 
STONE, WHERE THE LAW ENDS: THE SOCIAL CONTROL OF CORPORATE BEHAVIOR (1991); RAIMO 
TUOMELA, COOPERATION: A PHILOSOPHICAL STUDY (2000); RAIMO TUOMELA, THE IMPORTANCE 
OF US: A PHILOSOPHICAL STUDY OF BASIC SOCIAL NOTIONS (1995); RAIMO TUOMELA, THE 
PHILOSOPHY OF SOCIAL PRACTICES: A COLLECTIVE ACCEPTANCE VIEW (2002); MAX WEBER, 
ECONOMY AND SOCIETY: AN OUTLINE OF INTERPRETIVE SOCIOLOGY (Guenther Roth & Claus Wit-
tich eds., 1978); David E. Cooper, Collective Responsibility, 43 PHILOSOPHY 258 (1968); J. Angelo 
Corlett, Collective Moral Responsibility, 32 J. SOC. PHIL. 573 (2001); Michael Cunningham, Saying 
Sorry: The Politics of Apology, 70 POL. Q. 285 (1999); Joel Feinberg, Collective Responsibility, in 
COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY, supra, at 53; Mark Gibney & Erik Roxstrum, The Status of State 
Apologies, 23 HUM. RTS. Q. 911 (2001); Elizabeth Kiss, Saying We’re Sorry: Liberal Democracy 
and the Rhetoric of Collective Identity, 4 CONSTELLATIONS 377 (1998); Jan Narveson, Collective 
Responsibility, 6 J. ETHICS 179 (2002); John Ladd, Morality and the Ideal of Rationality in Formal 
Organizations, 54 MONIST 488 (1970); H. D. Lewis, Collective Responsibility, in COLLECTIVE 
RESPONSIBILITY, supra, at 17; Deborah Perron Tollefsen, Participant Reactive Attitudes and Collec-
tive Responsibility, 6 PHIL. EXPLORATIONS 218 (2003); Glen Pettigrove, Hannah Arendt and Collec-
tive Forgiving, 37 J. SOC. PHIL. 483 (2007); Linda Radzik, Collective Responsibility and Duties to 
Respond, 27 SOC. THEORY & PRAC. 455 (2001); Juha Räikkä, On Dissociating Oneself from Collec-
tive Responsibility, 23 SOC. THEORY & PRAC. 93 (1997); Manuel Velasquez, Why Corporations Are 
Not Morally Responsible for Anything They Do, in COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY, supra, at 111; Jeff 
McMahan, Collective Crime and Collective Punishment, CRIM. JUST. ETHICS, Winter/Spring 2008, 
at 4; David T. Risser, Punishing Corporations: A Proposal, BUS. & PROF. ETHICS J., Fall 1989, at 
83. 
 
For examples of significant discussions of collective responsibility, collective punishment, and col-
lective apologies outside of philosophy, see THE AGE OF APOLOGY: FACING UP TO THE PAST (Mark 
66
Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal, Vol. 13, Iss. 1 [2013], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/drlj/vol13/iss1/3
[Vol. 13: 35, 2013]  
PEPPERDINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION LAW JOURNAL 
101 
large-scale and high-stakes injuries, adding multiple loathsome offenders, 
scores of seriously injured victims, and a range of ultimate values to an al-
ready intricate analysis.  To complicate matters further, we find many of 
these exchanges within corporate and political bureaucracies obscured by 
complex fiduciary duties and chains of command. 
All of these concerns resurface in the contexts of collective acts of con-
trition within truth and reconciliation tribunals, international criminal courts, 
and various other corporate and organizational wrongdoings.  If we believe 
that repentant individuals deserve lenience, should the same be true of apol-
ogetic corporations or nations?  I generally view collective apologies with 
what I consider a healthy skepticism because they tend to serve as poor sub-
stitutes for categorical apologies from individual members of the group and 
allow individual wrongdoers to conceal their blameworthiness and deflect 
their personal responsibility into the abstractions of group identity.  Certain 
forms of collective apologies, however, can provide profound meaning and 
relief for many people.  Given my concerns about collective apologies, 
should an apology from a corporate executive or a political leader on behalf 
of the collective influence how we punish that leader or those who followed 
 
Gibney et al., eds., 2008); DANIELLE CELERMAJER, THE SINS OF THE NATION AND THE RITUAL OF 
APOLOGIES (2009); DIGESER, supra note 99; ALEXIS DUDDEN, TROUBLED APOLOGIES AMONG 
JAPAN, KOREA, AND THE UNITED STATES (2008); GENOCIDE’S AFTERMATH: RESPONSIBILITY AND 
REPAIR (Claudia Card & Armen T. Marsoobian eds., 2007); CHRISTOPHER KUTZ, COMPLICITY: 
ETHICS AND LAW FOR A COLLECTIVE AGE (2000); ENNIFER LIND, SORRY STATES: APOLOGIES IN 
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (2008); Girma Negash, A Political Calculus of Apology: Japan and Its 
Neighbors, in JUSTICE AND VIOLENCE: POLITICAL VIOLENCE, PACIFISM AND CULTURAL 
TRANSFORMATION 57 (Allan Eickelmann et al. eds., 2005); GIRMA NEGASH, APOLOGIA POLITICA: 
STATES AND THEIR APOLOGIES BY PROXIES (2006); MELISSA NOBLES, THE POLITICS OF OFFICIAL 
APOLOGIES (2008); SAMUEL P. OLINER, ALTRUISM, INTERGROUP APOLOGY, FORGIVENESS, AND 
RECONCILIATION (2008); SAMANTHA POWER, “A PROBLEM FROM HELL”: AMERICA AND THE AGE 
OF GENOCIDE (2002); TAKING WRONGS SERIOUSLY: APOLOGIES AND RECONCILIATION (Elazar Bar-
kan & Alexander Karn eds., 2006); Truth and Reconciliation Hearing Testimony of Former Presi-
dent F. W. de Klerk, in WHEN SORRY ISN’T ENOUGH, supra at 505; BRIAN A. WEINER, SINS OF THE 
PARENTS: THE POLITICS OF NATIONAL APOLOGIES IN THE UNITED STATES (2005); WHEN SORRY 
ISN’T ENOUGH, supra; Richard E. Bilder, The Role of Apology in International Law and Diplomacy, 
46 VA. J. INT’L. L. 433 (2006); Cohen, Apology and Organizations, supra note 14; Neil Funk-Unrau, 
The Re-Negotiation of Social Relations Through Public Apologies to Canadian Aboriginal Peoples, 
29 RES. SOC. MOVEMENTS, CONFLICT, & CHANGE 1 (2008); Colin Jones, supra note 13; Hilary K. 
Josephs, The Remedy of Apology in Comparative and International Law: Self-Healing and Reconcil-
iation, 18 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 53 (2004); Meierhenrich, supra note 36; Patel & Reinsch, supra 
note 14; Weyeneth, supra note 11; Eric K. Yamamoto, Race Apologies, 1 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 
47 (1997); Taryn Fuchs-Burnett, Mass Public Corporate Apology, DISP. RESOL. J., May-Jul. 2002, at 
26; Bernard H. Siegan, The United States Has Already Apologized for Racial Discrimination, in 
WHEN SORRY ISN’T ENOUGH, supra, at 413. 
67
Smith: Just Apologies: An Overview of the Philosophical Issues
Published by Pepperdine Digital Commons, 2013
 102 
her orders?  Should individual defendants benefit from apologies provided 
by the collective to which they belong, for instance if an executive cites 
statements of contrition offered by her corporation as evidence of her own 
remorse or if a general in a genocidal regime seeks leniency in a war crimes 
tribunal because her president has accepted blame for the atrocities?  In 
many cases, such collective apologies serve primarily to establish an official 
record through testimony and particular individuals need not accept blame 
nor even denounce the actions in question as morally wrong.  Occasionally, 
members of a collective will directly contradict each other with their testi-
mony, thus compromising meaning for the victim or community by provid-
ing divergent accounts of events or attributing blame to one another.  What-
ever conclusions we reach regarding the role of apologies in matters of 
criminal or civil justice for individuals, they will require considerable analy-
sis before they can be applied to collective acts of contrition. 
If problems related to collective apologies in criminal justice systems 
tend to arise primarily in a small but important fraction of cases, every act of 
mercy or lenience authorized by the state raises concerns related to collec-
tive forgiveness.  If an apology results in clemency, should we understand 
this as a kind of state-sanctioned collective forgiveness?  We typically do 
not think that a third party can forgive an offender on behalf of the victim—
for example, we can appreciate the limits of a murderer’s mother forgiving 
her while the victim’s family finds the offense unforgivable—and we should 
wonder if the state possesses standing to forgive or if this is a metaphor that 
stretches our moral concepts too thin. 
The highest courts continue to contest the meanings of collective apolo-
gies in law.  In the context of interpreting the 1993 resolution apologizing 
for the overthrow of the native Hawaiian government, for instance, in 2009 
the United States Supreme Court reversed the Supreme Court of Hawaii’s 
judgment by holding that the congressional apology did not alter the status 
of 1.2 million acres of lands once held by the native Hawaiians.175  Siding 
with the view that found such apologies “strictly symbolic,” such determina-
tions raise serious questions regarding whether collective apologies can pro-
vide substantive meaning in legal contexts. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
This paper poses far more questions than it answers, and most of my as-
sertions create more problems than they solve.  I hope to provide even-
handed discussions of these issues in Just Apologies: Remorse, Reform, and 
 
 175. Hawaii v. Office of Hawaiian Affairs, 129 S. Ct. 1436 (2009) (finding that Hawaii’s apol-
ogy did not take away its ability to sell or transfer ceded lands). 
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Punishment.  This represents a daunting task, and I very much appreciate the 
collegiality of the fellow contributors to this volume as we collaborate to ad-
dress intertwined interdisciplinary issues regarding reconciliation and law. 
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